Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability by Brown, Darryl K.
ARTICLE
STREET CRIME, CORPORATE CRIME, AND THE
CONTINGENCY OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
DARRiL K. BROWNl
INTRODUCTION
Theories of culpability and punishment in criminal law seek to
explain what conditions are necessary and sufficient for criminal pun-
ishment. Under a retributivist view, the defendant's fault or blame-
worthiness is not only necessary for punishment, but also functions as
an affirmative, justifyring reason to punish.' Retributivism asserts a
crucial role for criminal law's unique ability to express moral con-
demnation in addition to more concrete penalties, which civil sanc-
tions often can inflictjust as well.' Retributivism implies that when the
t Associate Professor and Alumni Faculty Fellow 2001-2002, Washington and Lee
University School of Law. I would like to thank Tony Dillof and Ellen Podgor for in-
sightful readings of earlier drafts. I also thank the Francis Lewis Law Center for re-
search funds that supported my work on this Article.
A An emerging virtue ethics theory of punishment shares with retributivism a retro-
spective moral judgment of the defendant's conduct, but finds the justification for
punishment in a particularized assessment of the offender's circumstances at the time
of his conduct; fault in this view is a judgment about the offender's lack of virtue, her
flawed practical reasoning, and ultimately her character. See Kyron Huigens, The Dead
Eud of Dtnence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 948, 1016-31 (2000) (explain-
ing the features of a virtue ethics theory of punishment).
Se, Henry NI. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404-06 (1958) (stating that the distinction between civil and criminal law is the
latter's power of moral condemnation); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in
Pdicing Coiporate Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer & Autumn 1997, at 23,
46 (contending that criminal punishment expresses moral disapproval even if the of-
lender is prepared to pay civil fines and restitution); Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The
Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 693, 707-08 (1993) (explaining the effectiveness of moral condemna-
tion).
See Lynch, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that civil sanctions are sometimes as severe
as criminal ones and that "there are many situations in which various civil or adminis-
trative remedies may provide a more significant deterrent than criminal punish-
ments"); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1863 (1992) (urging the use of punitive civil sanctions
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offender's conduct meets certain criteria, criminal punishment is not
only justified but necessary; in fact, the state has a duty to pursue it.
Deterrence, on the other hand, has no role for judgment of an of-
fender's fault or culpability except to the extent that expressing such
judgments furthers the deterrent effect of punishment.4 Deterrence
theory, strictly conceived, does not look retrospectively at an of-
fender's conduct for justification; its view is prospective, justifying a
sanction as a means to reduce future wrongdoing.
Even when retributivism or deterrence offers affirmative, justifying
reasons to punish offenders, however, in practice we seldom use
criminal law to address such wrongdoing. Many considerations affect
whether an offender will be charged and convicted beyond whether
his conduct accords with the elements of a crime or defense. One as-
pect of this broader assessment is the jury judgment, which can assess
an actor's particular circumstances to determine whether her actions
are blameworthy or not. But this process of assessment also occurs at
the initial stages of enforcement, when the police and prosecutors de-
cide to arrest and charge, and it is of even broader scope there. The
assessment at that stage looks not only at the circumstances around
the actor's conduct, but also takes account of a range of consequen-
tialist concerns and practical considerations, such as management of
limited resources. Further, such judgments are colored by social per-
spectives that help distinguish between otherwise similar instances of
conduct.5 This broad range of criteria explains how the government
answers the routine question that permeates criminal practice: when
an offender has violated the law and ajury would convict her, on what
grounds can the state decline to prosecute? Widespread declination is
not fully explained by the common rationale of managing limited re-
sources nor by the marginality of some criminal conduct, such as a
first offense or causing minimal harm,6 because the state sometimes
for deterrence of "petty and middle-range crimes, regulatory and administrative of-
fenses," and some "victimless" crimes).
4 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REv. 453,
488 (1997) (arguing that the law's moral credibility affects compliance, so the law
should accord with the public's moral sensibilities to maximize its deterrent function).
5 A punch in the nose is an easy case of battery, but when done by a husband to his
wife, it has long been treated differently than the same act among strangers. For an
excellent study exploring how social biases affect the provocation defense to homicide,
see Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997). For sources on domestic violence prosecution policy, see
the discussion in infra Part V.C.2.
6 For a brief account suggesting some bases other than resources for prosecutorial
discretion, see Lynch, supra note 2, at 61-63.
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employs extensive civil remedies for serious wrongdoing covered by
criminal statutes that is both intentional and imposes substantial
harm.7
To describe the actual working of criminal justice practice we
need to uncover the criteria, beyond the legal elements, for imposing
criminal culpability. Judgments of culpability are contingent not only
upon the blameworthiness of an offender's acts, but also upon the
perceived efficacy of criminal sanctions as a deterrent. Those assess-
ments, in turn, depend on the alternatives to criminal law-public and
private civil law, such as tort law or administrative regulation, as well as
other social policy options, such as nonlegal crime prevention strate-
gies like community youth programs and good corporate citizen cam-
paigns." Further, use of criminal law hinges on the social costs of both
crime and punishment. Finally, blameworthiness itself is not only
weighed against these consequentialist concerns, but shaped by them.
Criminal law's expressive and retributive functions sometimes
conflict because punitive approaches alienate offenders, reduce coop-
eration toward compliance, and may damage the legitimacy of law
that is important for deterrence. Even when morallyjustified, retribu-
tivist sanctions can harm prevention efforts and reduce voluntary
compliance. Faced with that irony, we sometimes decide to forgo
prosecution of offenders for whom we have affirmative, justifying rea-
sons to punish.
This Article makes three broad points. The first is as much con-
ceptual as practical: retributivist and deterrent motives sometimes
conflict. Determinations of criminal culpability are contingent on the
criminal law's civil alternatives and on its utilitarian costs and benefits.
The second is a political and policy point: this conflict is mediated in-
consistently, so that criminal liability is distributed more unevenly
among white-collar or corporate offenders than it is among street of-
fenders. This is not because of hard distinctions in those realms-dif-
ferent sorts of offenders, crimes, and possible remedies-but because
of how we have developed, or failed to develop, civil alternatives to
criminal law in each sector and the ideological lens through which we
make those alternatives appealing. Corporate and white-collar crime
prosecution differs from street crime prosecution because of its dif-
ferent mix of retributive and deterrence concerns, which leads corpo-
7 See iinfra notes 117-31 and accompanying text (discussing health care fraud and
enironmental statutes).
On good corporate citizen campaigns, see William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability,
Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1382-93 (1999).
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rate crime policy to take greater advantage of our knowledge of how
social norms interact with law, of the social costs that accompany pun-
ishment, and of the alternatives to criminal law. Criminal law is a
comparatively minor tool for addressing white-collar wrongdoing. For
street wrongdoing, in contrast, criminal law remains the dominant in-
strument. Our white-collar crime policy has a much better mix of
regulatory strategies, civil remedies, and criminal sanctions than our
street crime policy does. Our practice of punishment contributes to
unproductive retributivism in street crime law.
Third, the analysis yields practical policy recommendations.
Rather than accepting the long-standing argument that corporate
crime's tremendous harms require treating it more seriously, we
should instead treat street crime more like white-collar crime. We can
do this by expanding nascent policies already tested on a local scale
but that depart from the punitive trend that now characterizes street
crime policy.
My argument proceeds in five parts. The first Part reviews recent
literature on norms and other social phenomena, integrating and
comparing findings in street and white-collar contexts. These devel-
opments prompt the reassessment of criminal law's utilitarian value,
an insight acted upon much more in white-collar crime policy than in
street crime policy. Part II contrasts our dramatically different ap-
proaches to wrongdoing in street and corporate settings, a divergence
that looks odd in light of the explanatory power of the social norms
literature in both contexts. The next two Parts explore the reasons
for, and consequences of, these divergent approaches, arguing that
the distinction in enforcement strategies is largely unjustified by dif-
ferences in offenders, conduct, or harm in the two contexts; the analy-
sis shows why street crime policy remains less effective and less fair
than its white-collar counterpart, with higher social costs. Part V sug-
gests how we could move street crime enforcement and punishment
productively in the direction of white-collar practice by reducing the
role of criminal law in favor of civil and regulatory strategies sensitive
to social norm insights.
I. SOCIAL NORMS, SocIAL COSTS, AND STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS
In this Part, I briefly review some now-familiar social forces that
criminal law scholarship has recognized in recent years as central to
understanding how law works to regulate behavior. I cover this famil-
iar ground to highlight its insights for white-collar as well as street
crime, to provide a reference for the analysis that follows, and to situ-
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ate within it two features somewhat underemphasized in discussions
on law and social norms: structural influences and psychological reac-
tions to enforcement strategies such as resentment.
A. Social Norms and Social Influence
Criminal law scholarship recently has developed several important
insights that provide a basis for revising our practice of criminal jus-
tice. First is the wealth of attention to the role informal social norms
play in governing behavior. Traditional deterrence theory focuses on
formal legal sanctions as the important influence on potential of-
fender conduct; if we increase either the certainty of conviction or se-
verity of punishments, rational offenders should reduce their miscon-
duct. This premise presumably underlies the dramatic increase in
incarceration rates in the last quarter-century. Social norms describe
the informal, nonlegal rules that shape behavior, including decisions
to Niolate the law. Norms arise among all sorts of social groups; they
are the informal rules that describe conduct that groups either en-
courage through rewards or discourage through informal sanctions.9
Related to norms is the idea of social influence, which describes
the well-known phenomenon that our choices are influenced by what
other people choose and approve of. We conform our behavior to
that of others in all sorts of ways, from fashion and speech customs to
choosing television shows, political candidates, or restaurants; to join-
ing in mob violence, cheating on taxes, or committing other crimes.10
The more others around us do something, the more likely we are to
approve of it and to do it as well. The more others avoid certain con-
duct, the more likely we will act similarly. Behavior and preferences
are shaped by what those around us are doing, wanting, or approv-
ing."
With the recognition of the role that social norms and influence
play in fostering law-breaking or law-abiding, scholars have drawn in-
" For information on norms and their relationship to the law, see generally
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LW 123-240 (1991); Robert D. Cooter, Decen-
tralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, De-
velpmnirnt, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350-51 (1997).
Ser ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SocIAL ANIMAL 13-55 (8th ed. 1999) (giving many
examples of conduct affected by social influence); FRANK A. CoWELL, CHEATING THE
GOVERNMENT 102-03 (1990) (giving the example of cheating on taxes as a moral be-
halior influenced by others).
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrenc4 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
352-61 (1997) (discussing the interaction between social influence and crime).
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creasing attention to the interaction of law and norms. Legal goals of
crime prevention or dispute resolution are more likely to be successful
if the law can work in conjunction with social norms. The law can fos-
ter compatible social norms-norms that encourage the same conduct
that the law wants to encourage-and can diminish the strength of
norms that conflict with legal goals, like reduction of harmful wrong-
doing.1 2 It can work to shape the social influences that lead people to
law-breaking or law-abiding. For instance, if the law can reduce the
perception that crime and disorder are widespread in a neighbor-
hood, crime rates are likely to decline; this is a key premise of order-
maintenance or community policing.5 It also supports government
efforts to ensure that large firms have formal "compliance plans" in
place to discourage law-breaking by employees; those plans signal the
unacceptability of rule-breaking in a corporate setting.14 Moreover,
the law may be ineffective if it does not do so. Social norms and influ-
ence likely affect crime rates more than the law's deterrent of in-
creased punishment."
The ideas of social norms and influence are related to the notion
of local culture, be it within a firm, a street gang, neighboring ranch-
ers, or another social group.'6 Social norms and influence are strong-
est among tightly knit social groups. Thus, juvenile gangs are an ex-
ample of how a group's influence encourages crime, as are certain
distressed neighborhoods that perpetuate patterns of crime over time,
even as members change.' 7 Another version of this idea comes from
Berle and Means's classic thesis of the modern corporation, in which
ownership is sufficiently remote that managers can develop a "man-
agerialist culture" not dictated by either owners or the imperatives of
1I am avoiding terms like "criminal wrongdoing" or "crime commission" at this
point because, later in the Article, I emphasize the contingency of whether harmful
conduct gets labeled and treated as a crime or a mere civil wrong.
3 See infra Part V.A.
4 For a discussion of corporate compliance plans and the effect thereon of federal
sentencing guidelines, see Laufer, supra note 8, at 1386-88.
Kahan, supra note 11, at 359-61.
The seminal work often credited with reviving legal scholars' interest in social
norms is ELLICKSON, supra note 9, which studied norms among ranchers in Shasta
County, California.
17 See Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Albert Lewis Rhodes, The Distribution of Juvenile Delin-
quency in the Social Class Structure, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 720, 728-30 (1961) (giving empirical
data correlating delinquency rates with some lower-class neighborhoods); Robert J.
Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theoy of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality,
in CRIME AND INEQUALriY 37 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (asserting
that community-level factors contribute to crime).
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the market."' Organizational theorists have extended this idea by ar-
guing that "[olrganizational culture forms the 'touchstone' by which
individuals behave and act" and is key to explaining how firms can re-
sist or distort even managers' intent." Reports of "corporate cultures"
that foster criminal conduct sometimes explain long patterns of white-
collar crime within firms,"' and some regulators try to design en-
forcement strategies to encourage "corporate virtue" or a social influ-
ence toward compliance with the law within a firm.
B. Legitimac, of Law and Enforcement Practices
Social norms and the localized cultures they help define interact
with another factor that impacts how effectively legal regimes work.
Public perceptions of the law's legitimacy or moral credibility can ei-
ther sustain or undermine substantive law. Legitimacy increases both
voluntary compliance and cooperation with enforcement. People
largely obey the law not because of the fear of punishment, but be-
cause they agree with its substantive content and see it as morally
credible, a belief that is reinforced by society. They cooperate with
enforcement efforts-whether, for example, as jurors who apply the
law or citizens who assist police as cooperative witnesses-for similar
reasons: they see the rules and their administration as fair and justi-
fied.2 '
Both in the white-collar and street settings of criminal law, legiti-
macy issues affect the structure and efficacy of enforcement policies
1 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PI'ATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932); FIONA
HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION 23 (1997).
I-INES, supra note 18, at 25.
See, e.g., Floyd Norris & Diana B. Henriques, 3 Admit Guilt in Falsifying CUC's
Books: The -Culture" of Fraud That Shrank Cendant, N.Y. TIIES, June 15, 2000, at Cl
(-[T]he largest and longest accounting fraud in history, continuing at least 12 years
and costing investors $19 billion .... [, occurred because) '[i]t was a culture that had
been developing over many years,' .... 'It was just ingrained in all of us... by our su-
periors ... .'" (quoting Cosmo Corigliano, the former CFO of CUC)).
A, See, e.g., HAINES, supra note 18, at 33-36 (discussing social regulation, such as of
occupational health and safety).
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILInY AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 5-7, 201-03 (1995) (analyzing the relation-
ship of community views with the criminal law); TOM R. TyER, WrHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
L.W (1990) (finding that the degree to which people view legal authorities as legiti-
mate predicts their willingness to obey the laws); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E.
Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval, and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Be-
havior; 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 332-34 (1980) (arguing that the degree to
which people view the law as morally valid predicts their obedience to law).
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and sometimes aggravate the inevitable social costs of criminal en-
forcement. Yet those issues play out differently in the two settings.
On the street crime side, the trend toward punitive incarceration over
the last thirty years, which has had disparate effects on the African-
American community, has clearly undermined the legitimacy of law
enforcement in black communities.3 Scholars have warned about the
substantial legitimacy costs of racially disparate enforcement policies,
including the targeting of minority drug offenders more than upper-
class white offenders,24 the federal sentencing differential between
crack and cocaine offenses, and traffic stops motivated by racial profil-
ing.n This legitimacy problem surfaces in "ground level" expressions
like nullification ofjury votes26 and noncooperation with police inves-
tigators.27 Street crime enforcement policies are less effective and
even counterproductive when crucial groups view law enforcement as
illegitimate and adopt social norms that undermine the law.
Enforcement in white-collar settings faces comparable legitimacy
concerns. Consider the broad scope of the administrative and crimi-
nal law that governs wrongdoing and social harm in commercial set-
tings. The deregulation movement over the last two decades is a re-
sponse to the perceived dysfunction of regulatory regimes governing
business. Prominent scholarly accounts of the administrative state de-
scribing "how regulation fails" and how those failures prompt a "crisis
of legitimacy" exemplify the criticisms. Health care fraud is a perfect
23 See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT: YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE
CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM (1990) (documenting the
disproportionate share of African-Americans in prisons). For an example from a gen-
eration ago, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
157 (1968), known as the Kerner Commission report, which found "deep hostility be-
tween police and ghetto communities" to be a primary cause of urban riots.
24 See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1835 (1998)
("This is no subtle, indirect tilt against black drug crime-here, the bias is both direct
and highly visible.").
See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 153, 158, 383 (1997) (dis-
cussing race as a factor in law enforcement). See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUA L
JUSTICE 169-78 (1999) (describing legitimacy problems caused by racially skewed poli-
cies and their adverse effects on crime rates).
26 Jeffrey Rosen, One Ang7y Woman, NEW YORKER, Feb. 24/Mar. 3, 1997, at 54 (de-
scribing the increase in hung juries in Washington, D.C. criminal trials).
27 COLE, supra note 25, at 169-78; Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment,
Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities
(Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Columbia Law Sch., Paper No. 10,
Mar. 25, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (examining the effect of criminal punish-
ment on African-American communities), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
paper.taPabstractjid=223148.
26 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 84-102 (1990) (arguing that
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example. Hospital and physician groups have vocally complained of
the Justice Department "'using the False Claims Act as a blunt instru-
ment to victimize hospitals who make innocent errors',21) and of regu-
latory agencies that "have become overly aggressive in their pursuit of
cost-containment initiatives in the guise of fraud [prosecutions] ."°
The groups have also complained that the "federal government's tac-
tics have consistently taken a punitive approach with physicians, rather
than one of education and prevention"3' and have "coerce[d] medical
schools, hospitals and teaching physicians into forfeiting millions of
dollars of fees billed in good faith." 2 Another example is the Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Administration ("OSHA"), which is often cited
as an example of an ill-conceived, poorly executed regulatory regime.
OSHA inspectors long have had a record of constantly citing firms for
low-level violations and imposing moderate fines that destroyed any
cooperative relationship between firms and regulators.3 Yet OSHA's
approach has carried no real threat of serious penalties because the
agency rarely imposes them.m Similarly, its regulatory scheme has
been ineffective in key respects; an OSHA regulation on vinyl chlo-
ride, for example, cost the industry $40 million to implement, yet was
estimated to save only one life annually. 5
the undemocratic processes and outcomes of regulatory agencies lead to "an outpour-
ing of writing on the crisis of legitimacy").
L. Timothy StoltzfusJost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back- A Critique of
the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 243 (1999) (quot-
ing Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Advocacy Papers for the 1998 Annual Meeting: Your Mission on Capi-
tol Hill, at http://-.%,s.aha.org/repeaI.html (last modified Jan. 20, 1998)).
R'ANDOLPH D. SMOAK, JR., Ai. MED. ASS'N, BOARD OF TRUsTEES REPORT 34-1-
98: MEDIC \RE "FRAUD ,D ABUSE" UPDATE 1 (1998), available at http://w.ama-
aissn.org/meetings/public/int1998/reports/onsite/bot/botrtf/botrep34.rtf.
Q Id.
i_ Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges, Concerns and Recommendations Regarding the Physicians
at Teaching Hospitals (PATH) Initiative, at http://v.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/
concerns.huu (last modified Dec. 7, 1999).
So JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION
IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 66-70 (1988) (describing how one company adopted a policy
to limit OSHA inspections while also acknowledging agreement with the purpose of
the OSHA Act).q See LNIA IRES & JOHN BRAITHWArrE, RESPONSIvE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULTION DEBATE 8, 49 (1992) ("OSHA has always been a weak regulatory
presence, even if its tiny band of rulebook-oriented inspectors were at times an irrita-
tion to American business."); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE
BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 104-16 (1982) (finding that
OSHA's unreasonable rules and surprise checks deter plant managers from complying
with regulations); REES, supra note 33._, JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF ToxIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION 22
(1988); see alsoW. KIPVICUSI, RISKBY CHOICE 73-104 (1983) (arguing that OSHA's de-
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Finally, environmental regulation is often cited for conspicuous
failures and inefficiencies that undermine legitimacy with regulated
firms. One of many complaints is that environmental regulators, es-
pecially in the 1970s and 1980s, employed "command-and-control"
strategies that dictated regulatory goals. The requirement that firms
use the "best available technology" to remedy nontrivial risks was "ex-
ceptionally inefficient" because it "ignore[d] the enormous differ-
ences among plants and industries and... require[d] the same tech-
nology in diverse areas-regardless of whether they [we] re polluted or
clean, populated or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean up.""
Sometimes, the requirement was imposed in ignorance of whether the
cost of compliance could shut down a plant or industry.
7
In all of these contexts, punitive enforcement engendered resis-
tance from target groups and their communities, creating a reduced
incentive to cooperate with regulators to sustain compliance." Strate-
gies to minimize resistance, resentment, and diminished credibility
are now widely touted as key to optimal law enforcement and preven-
tion. One of the recent prominent arguments against command-and-
control regulation is that it engenders an adversarial resentment in
regulated firms that leads to greater resistance of regulatory standards
and less cooperative compliance by firms. Ayres and Braithwaite con-
clude from empirical studies that a regulatory "strategy based mostly
on punishment fosters an organized business subculture of resistance
to regulation wherein methods of legal resistance and counterattack
are incorporated into industry socialization,"," a pattern found in
other studies as well.4° Maintaining the credibility of both the sub-
tailed workplace design standards produced little safety improvement while the agency
underregulated significant risks posed by carcinogenic substances).
36 SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 87
37 Id. at 87, 92; see also VICUSI, supra note 35, at 98 (describing how the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") could have administered the Clean Air Act
amendments to "diminish its pathologies... and to impose lower costs," but "failed to
do so").
38 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 19-25 (describing how overly puni-
tive, distrusting, and aggressive enforcement engenders resentment and "resistance to
regulation" from firms); John Braithwaite, Criminological Theory and Organizational
Crime, 6JUST. Q. 333, 343-45 (1989) (arguing that criminal subcultures are less likely to
develop where counterproductive stigmatizing is avoided).
39 AYRES & BRAITHWAIrE, supra note 34, at 20 (citing BARDACH & KAGAN, supra
note 34); see also id. at 49 ("[In p]oorly conceived regulatory strategies... cooperation
[with regulated firms] is destroyed without any of the benefits that can flow from
tough enforcement being secured.").
40 See Peter Cleary Yeager, Industrial Water Pollution, in BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 97, 138 (Michael Tonry & Albert J. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1993)
(noting pollution field inspectors' "perception[s] that enforcement must be patient
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stance of the law and the means of enforcement is key to increasing
law-abidingness and lowering enforcement costs.
C. Social Capital and Social Costs
The social capital, or social organization, of communities also af-
fects compliance. Scholars have described how the law can contribute
to, or decrease, social capital. Fagan and Meares argue in a recent
paper that criminal justice policies undermine social infrastructure;
the policies reduce employment opportunities, family income and
stability, and adult supervision of children, thereby aggravating crime
problems by reducing informal controls and support for law-
abidingness." Excessively punitive law enforcement may be aggravat-
ing "criminogenic" influences, increasing crime through ill-guided
strategies designed to reduce it. Moreover, when ancillary costs are
excessive, they help undermine the legitimacy of criminal law and en-
forcement policy, which can in turn make enforcement and preven-
tion efforts less effective.
Comparable concerns animate debates over regulation of wrong-
doing in corporate settings. The generation of adversarial cultures of
resistance to regulation describes one way that the social capital nec-
essary to minimize wrongdoing is decreased. Efforts to reinvent regu-
lation in a more cooperative and collaborative form by supplanting
command-and-control regulation aim to increase the social infrastruc-
ture-the attitudes within firms and industries and the relations be-
tween firms and enforcement officials-thereby decreasing wrongdo-
ing without resorting to the deterrence of punitive sanctions. 2 While
criminal law scholars and policyrnakers in recent years have given
some attention to such cooperative strategies, 3 regulatory scholarship
and 'rexmonable' lest it produce uncooperative attitudes toward compliance on the
part of the regulated businesses").
Fagan & Meares, supra note 27, at Part IV.
Cooperative regulatory strategies that foster partnerships between public and
priate players and replace punitive enforcement are a common theme in regulation
scholarship. See, e.g., AIRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 101 (suggesting enforced
Self-regulation); REES, supra note 33, at 10 (studying OSHA's Cooperative Compliance
Program); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Com-
phance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVIL. L. REv. 297, 305-11 (1999) (recognizing
that regulators and courts give private parties room for noncompliance); Jody Free-
man, Cllaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1, 21-33 (1997)
(using EPA and OSHA programs as examples); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz,
Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA (Nov.
11, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
I S;, e ,.g., Fagan & Meares, supra note 27, at Part III (discussing social capital and
130520011
1306 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1295
and agency practice have a much longer and more extensive record of
attention to this issue. Such strategies have animated major policy re-
visions in the past two decades.i
Attention to social capital raises awareness of the social costs not
only of wrongdoing, but also of sanctions and enforcement strategies
that respond to wrongdoing. Criminal sanctions impose costs on oth-
ers beyond the defendant, and they impose costs on defendants be-
yond the formal components of punishment. Taking full account of
these social costs is crucial to assessing whether a criminal or civil en-
forcement regime functions well. Within the street crime category,
the dominant example of such costs is the disproportionate burden
placed on the black community. Criminal sanctions hurt offenders
and those connected to them by social networks in significant ways.
Criminal records and prison time, in addition to engendering anger
and resentment in offenders , significantly reduce employment pros-
pects and earning power in the later years and also correlate with in-
46creased crime activity after prison. Those reduced prospects make
investment in job skills seem less promising, leading convicts to invest
less in job-readiness education. 47 Those injured by an ex-convict's lim-
ited employment prospects include family members and potential
family members, as ex-convicts are less appealing marriage prospects,
leading to more households headed by single women. Removal of
young adults from the community to prison means fewer adults are
available to supervise children. Prison can aggravate antisocial atti-
tudes and resentments can lead to further wrongdoing. 8 The com-
bined negative effects of street crime laws and enforcement choices
tear at the fabric of disadvantaged communities, aggravating the social
structural influences on crime in poor, African-American neighborhoods).
-1 Two examples are OSHA's Cooperative Compliance Program, REES, supra note
33, at 10, and the EPA's strategy of substituting agreements on Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects for some monetary sanctions, David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of
Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998
Wisc. L. REv. 1181,1187.
45 DANIEL VAN NEss & KAREN H. STRONG, RESTORINGJUSTICE 43 (1997); MARTIN
WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: A RESTORATIVE RESPONSE TO CRIME
11, 40 (2d ed. 1996).
46 Fagan & Meares, supra note 27.
47 See id. ("A released convict may perceive further investment in human capital to
be useless because he may understandably reason that sinking money and time into
education and training will not overcome the stigma of a felony conviction on a job
application.").
48 See, e.g., Michael Berryhill, Prisoner's Dilemma: Did the Texas Prison System KillJames
B rd?, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 1999, at 18 (arguing that incarceration aggravated in-
mates' racist views and led to the brutal killing ofJames Byrd).
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problems in those communities of low employment rates, family in-
stability, and the lack of social organization that facilitates law-
abidingness. These costs are imposed especially on low-income mi-
nority communities, which have the least capable social infrastructures
to compensate for them. African-Americans are incarcerated at rates
drastically higher than their percentage of the population.4  Moreo-
ver, this disproportionate focus of criminal justice on racial minorities
infuses interpersonal relations and public consciousness with racial-
ized images of crime and criminals.5" All of these are ancillary costs to
a social policy confronting street crime that emphasizes criminal con-
viction and imprisonment.
Administrative law literature is full of accounts of regulatory ef-
forts that have proven ill-conceived and counterproductive in compa-
rable ways-for example, by failing to meet the social purposes the
statutes or regulations aimed to address, creating perverse side effects,
imposing costs that exceed benefits,"' and, through such missteps, en-
gendering "business subculture[s] of resistance" to enforcement
goals.'" Scholars repeatedly find that "administrators take insufficient
account of the systemic effects of regulatory controls" 3 and act in self-
interested or myopic ways that result in not only "irrational and
overzealous regulation... [but also] inadequate protection."" Regu-
latory dysfunction stems from "a failure of diagnosis or of coordina-
tion"" causing firms to incur compliance costs not outweighed by the
regulation's benefits, thus aggravating one social harm as it mitigates
I- So', COLE, supra note 25, at 144 ("From 1986 to 1991, the number of white drug
offenders incarcerated in state prisons increased by 110 percent, but the number of
black drug offenders increased by 465 percent."); MADUER, supra note 23, at 145
(do Jcumenting the disproportionate number of African-Americans in prisons and not-
ing a similar disparity for juvenile drug arrests); DOUGLAS C. MCDoNALD & KENNETH
E. CARLSON, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? THE
TRVxNSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986-90, at 1-2, 13-17 (1993) (documenting
longer sentences for black offenders than for white offenders and attributing the dif-
ference in part to harsher sentences for crack than for cocaine, but also finding differ-
ences for larceny and weapons offenses not explained by nonracial factors).
" S,,JODy DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81-101 (1997) (discussing how "negrophobia"
arises in private and public narratives); KATHERN, K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME:
RtCIAL HO, AXEs, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND
OHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 1-13 (1998) (describing perceptions of black people).
SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 74.
- AiRES & BRPITHmuITE, supra note 34, at 20.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 98.
' Id. at 99.
IM. at 105.
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another. The OSHA regulation of vinyl chloride noted above is one
example; 6 regulation of the ethanol industry as a strategy for reducing
air pollution may be anotherY'
Another form of social costs can accompany corporate criminal
punishment. Scholars have noted that firms typically suffer a measur-
able decline in stock value as a result of criminal sanctions, arguablyI 58
resulting in inefficient over-deterrence. Sanctions against firms may
hurt workers, their families, and their local economies. Such harm to
third parties can affect charging discretion-for example, prosecutors
may forgo criminal punishment for civil remedies against fraudulent
health care providers if the offender is the sole provider for a com-
munity, thereby aiming to reduce the social harm of lost health care
services." In both street and white-collar settings, then, punishment
can have significant social costs for which officials often do not fully
account, making some enforcement strategies counterproductive.
One finds descriptions of enforcement approaches in both adminis-
trative and criminal contexts described as "paradoxes" because they
undermine their very goals and purposes.60 Yet responses to critical
appraisals of social costs and diminished social capital differ substan-
tially in street and white-collar contexts in how they inform enforce-
ment choices.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
57 See William M. Brown, The Renewable Oxygenate Requirement: A Boon for the Envi-
ronment or a Boondoggle for the Ethanol Industry?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1299 (1997) (dis-
cussing the EPA's efforts to reduce air pollution and the effect on the ethanol industry,
and noting the possibility that the EPA's regulations could lead to increased air pollu-
tion).
I' See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime:
Evidence 42 J.L. & ECON. 489 (1999) (describing extralegal sanctions for corporate
crime).
59 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE, reprinted in 2 Health
Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 459, 460-61 (1998) [hereinafter FCA GUIDANCE] (stating that
Justice Department attorneys should consider alternative remedies and the potential
impact of enforcement decisions on communities before initiating fraud actions
against health care providers); Jost & Davies, supra note 29, at 285 (arguing that in
such cases the community would suffer "special harm by the provider's exclusion").
6O See HAINES, supra note 18, at 220 (describing "a paradox where demand for in-
creased accountability through the courts could produce less virtue," or compliance, in
some firms). Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 106 (discussing the "simple empiri-
cal truths" and four major administrative examples of "paradoxes of the regulatory
state"), with Fagan & Meares, supra note 27 (analyzing the paradoxical effects of crimi-
nal punishment).
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D. Structural Influences
Another consideration that helps to explain misconduct has re-
ceived somewhat less attention in legal scholarship on social norms.
Structural conditions, particularly an actor's economic setting, greatly
affect that actor's tendencies toward wrongdoing. Contemporary
theorists have moved beyond the economic determinism of Marxist
analyses on this point but still draw attention to the structural de-
mands that constrain actors, whether they be individuals within com-
munity subgroups or firms in a given market sector.6' Structural re-
straints and local cultures-a community's "street" culture or a firm's
corporate culture, for example-interrelate. Culture is not dictated by
structural limits or economic pressures; not all groups in distressed
communities turn to drug crime as a substitute for legitimate eco-
nomic activity. Equally, not all firms in competitive markets regularly
subvert costly regulatory restraints, which we might think of as a rough
equivalent to bans on drug trafficking in locales with few other oppor-
tunities. Nonetheless, economic position is a form of structural pres-
sure that makes some cultures, and individual choices, more or less
likely. William Julius Wilson's work describing the social and cultural
consequences of structural pressure, including higher crime rates in
communities deprived of job opportunities and, thus, traditions of
regular employment, broadly fits this idea." Comparably, there is
considerable empirical evidence that smaller firms with thin capital
and profit margins more frequently engage in wrongdoing ranging
from fraud to lower safety standards and breach of environmental
rules." Larger, wealthier firms arguably do not as often face the same
,. HAINES, supra note 18, at 20-23 (discussing Marxist analysis and small firms);
Yeager, supra note 40, at 126-27, 130-31 (discussing how the financial health of large
and small firms correlates with environmental violations and success in defending
against the EPA).
". See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (describing the cultural side effects of high crime rates
in the inner-city ghetto); Sampson & Wilson, supra note 17 (inquiring into the com-
munity structures of race and crime).
... See, e.g., Hugh D. Barlow, From Fiddle Factors to Networks of Collusion: Charting the
Waters of Small Business Crime, 20 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 319 (1993) (noting the costs
of small business crime and calling for criminologists to redirect their efforts toward
such crimes); William N. Leonard & Manin Glenn Weber, Automakers and Dealers: A
Stud) of Criminogenic Market Forces, in WrHITE-COLLAR CRIME: OFFENcES IN BUSINESS,
POLITICS, AND THE PROFESSIONS 133 (Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier eds., 1977) (dis-
cussing white-collar offenses among car dealers); Adam Sutton & Ronald Wild, Small
Busines: 11hiite-Collar Villains or Victims?, in UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 78, 79 (Mark Findlay & Russell Hogg eds., 1988) ("P[lhen prosecutions are
compared %ith estimates on actual numbers and types of enterprises operating in the
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pressures for survival, in part because they may have "regulatory
economies of scale" that more easily manage or spread compliance
costs. '4 Attention to those sorts of pressures provides an explanation
for misconduct that is an alternative to theories that merely emphasize
an actor's lack of virtue, moral character, or independent local cul-
ture. And that sort of alternative understanding, recognizing struc-
tural pressures, has implications for prevention, enforcement, and
punishment policies. Legal policies that can take account of these
factors are more likely to succeed at the goals of crime prevention and
harm reduction.
This collection of ideas about extralegal influences on wrongdo-
ing has important implications for enforcement and the design of le-
gal sanctions, but it also affects deeper conceptual premises of crimi-
nal law. Criminal law imposes responsibility based on strong ideas of
free will. Criminal law by its very design and operation narrows the
focus of concern, and thus the basis for legal responsibility, to a lim-
ited time frame and set of influences and situational factors around
the offender's acts. Criminal law resists structural and contextual ex-
planations for offender conduct; opening the door to recognizing
those influences is a slippery slope to exculpation based on notions of
determinism, something like a "rotten social background" defense, or
excuses based on peer pressure or employer/coworker pressure fal-
ling far short of duress. Even while scholars, and to some extent poli-
cymakers, increasingly acknowledge the reality of social influences on
individual and group conduct, criminal law must repress those realiza-
tions and continue to operate on a "notoriously shaky" idea of free
will. 6' As a result, while recognition of social influence makes its way
into some realms of criminal justice policy, particularly in prevention
Australian economy, they seem to suggest that the larger a company becomes, the
more likely it is to be law-abiding."); Steve Tombs, "The Causes of Coal-Mine Accidents",
Worker Autonomy, and the Myth of the Small Firm, 19 INDUS. REL.J. 248 (1988) (respond-
ing to the argument that worker autonomy in small business leads to higher accident
rates); Yeager, supra note 40, at 126-27, 130-31 (noting that larger firms succeeded
more against EPA enforcement while "poorer financial health led to greater involve-
ment in environmental violations, particularly among companies operating in indus-
tries with capital liquidity and turnover problems"); see also William S. Laufer, A Study of
Small Business Compliance Practices, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA:
STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 135 (1995) (noting that small
businesses account for at least ninety percent of corporate convictions in the federal
courts annually).
64Yeager, supra note 40, at 130.
65 Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. RE%,.
959, 960 (1992).
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and enforcement strategies, substantive doctrine is largely resistant to
it. Nonetheless, the power of the ideas has made its way into isolated
pockets of rules and policy. '
Furthermore, these ideas of social influence, capital, costs, and
structure affect the continuing debate between the long-dueling ra-
tionales for criminal law, deterrence theory, and retributive or desert-
oriented theory. Social influence ideas ultimately support utilitarian
rationales, although they call for substantial revision of strategies that
rest solely on the deterrent effect of formal sanctions on isolated ra-
tional actors. On the other hand, because they challenge the premise
of an autonomous, free-willed actor unhindered by relevant contex-
tual factors, they subtly challenge retributive theory. One whose social
influences and daily moral education lead him away from the dictates
of formal rules can be seen as less blameworthy for violating those
rules. That challenge is far from sufficient to move us to accept full-
fledged excuses based on social influence, yet it helps to shift thinking
away from criminal punishment of individuals as a dominant goal of
the law and toward a mix of strategies in which we will trade off crimi-
nal liability for more effective means of prevention, restitution, and
even punishment. Social influence theory shifts thinking from retri-
bution to new forms of deterrence, from punishment to prevention,
and ultimately from criminal law to civil. In this way it facilitates the
contingency of criminal law. It affects our choice to use criminal law
when we have, or can develop, civil and regulatory alternatives. Im-
portantly, though, these challenges posed by recognition of social in-
fluences play out very differently in the realms of street and corporate
criminal law. The next Part explores two respects in which the con-
ceptual underpinnings of criminal law evolve in different ways in the
street and corporate sectors, due in large part to varying acceptance of
social influence arguments.
II. DIVERGENT STRATEGIES FOR WRONGDOING IN STREET AND
WHITE-COLLAR SETTINGS
Enforcement officials in both street and corporate crime sectors
can choose from a range of policy strategies to confront wrongdoing.
S'e Laufer, supra note 8 (discussing the "good corporate citizen" movement);
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components, All United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999),
http://wv.bna.com/prodhome/leg/guidance.html [hereinafter Holder] (listing as
one factor to be considered in whether to charge a corporation the "existence and
adequacy of the corporation's compliance program").
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Scholarship and enforcement policy in recent years have explored
which strategies work most effectively given insights about social influ-
ence, legitimacy problems, structural limits, and the social costs of dif-
ferent enforcement options. Both street and corporate crime sectors
have a history of taking relatively little account of these factors and re-
lying on command-and-control, punitive-oriented approaches to deter
wrongdoing. Fairly recently, however, strategies in these two sectors
67have significantly diverged so that regulators of corporate Arongdo-
ing increasingly choose more cooperative, compliance-seeking strate-
gies aimed at encouraging law-abidingness, even as white-collar crimi-
nal sanctions have increased. The scholarly criticisms of regulatory
dysfunction combine with politically salient complaints from regu-
lated firms to undermine the legitimacy of command-style regulation
and motivate a gradual but fairly widespread reform. Policies target-
ing street-level wrongdoing, meanwhile, remain dominated by puni-
tive command-and-control strategies-the traditional mode of crimi-
nal law-that are increasingly rejected in corporate regulation.
Deregulation and reinvention of regulation have been central fix-
tures of regulatory policy debates for two decades and recently have
had moderate success in legislation, enforcement policies, and the
scholarly literature68 These debates address the inevitable choice for
enforcement policy between command-style punitive approaches and
cooperative, compliance-seeking strategies aimed at encouraging law-
abidingness.W I will use Ayres and Braithwaite as providing a leading
example of scholarship criticizing punitive regulation and reconceiv-
ing regulation on a model of collaboration and dialogue between
regulated firms and government officials. They describe regulators'
17 I do not mean to overstate the recency of this divergence. There have always
been great distinctions in how we address white-collar and street-level wrongdoing; we
have long used civil and regulatory mechanisms for the former that have no parallels
for the latter. I refer here more to the shift away from command-and-control, which is
still the approach that characterizes street crime enforcement, within regulatory policy
and theory over the last two decades.
68 See AYRES & BRAIT-WAITE, supra note 34, at 7-12 (reviewing the regulatory phi-
losophies of the Carter and Reagan administrations); HAINES, supra note 18, at 8 ("In-
stead of renewed determination to prosecute, the key concept in this latest shift in the
regulatory debate is a perceived need to encourage trust between regulator and regu-
lated."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 30-31, 99-100 (detailing the deregulation of the
1970s and 1980s and suggesting that regulatory efforts are "hampered by the power of
well-organized private groups"); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation:
The DangerousJourneyfrom Command to Self-Control 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998)
(critically assessing regulatory reinvention in environmental law).
69 See A'YRES & BRAIT-rIuTE, supra note 34, at 20 (comparing "deterrence" versus
"compliance" models of regulation).
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options between these two broad approaches as choices between a fo-
cus on punishment or persuasion. In a series of works on business
regulation, Ayres and Braithwaite have argued for an "enforcement
pyramid" strategy, in which regulators mostly rely on cooperation and
self-regulation-the base of the pyramid-but have increasingly puni-
tive options up to command regulation with nondiscretionary pun-
ishment at the top of the pyramid as a background threat-the "be-
nign big gun"-for use on the occasional noncompliant firm." Such a
strategy fosters firm cooperation with law enforcement goals-even
costly ones-and relies on regulated firms' respect for the legitimacy
of the enforcement regime. This accords with Tom Tyler's well-
known work on procedural fairness, which has found that people ac-
cept the legitimacy of justice systems and even unfavorable outcomes
much more when they experience the system as procedurally fair.'
"[R]egulators should not do without an image of invincibility in the
background, and should be reluctant to push punishment to the fore-
ground of day-to-day regulatory encounters. They do best when they
are benign big guns. "72
Corporate regulation has always worked within a more utilitarian
tradition than the expressive, desert-oriented one that typifies con-
temporary street crime policy. 73  Partially as a result, cooperation-
oriented regulatory strategy has found much wider acceptance in
white-collar contexts than in street-level contexts.74 For example, the
Ayres-Braithwaite strategy focuses on prevention and compliance,
whereas street crime policies focus on wrongdoing detection and se-
vere, expressive punishment.
The rationales behind the Ayres-Braithwaite proposal are now
widely accepted in regulatory debate and increasingly characterize en-
forcement practice. A driving motivation of this approach is to reduce
the "psychology of resentment," the prospect that firms and individu-
als confronted with inflexible commands and harsh punishments
adopt a critical, noncooperative posture toward compliance goals and
enforcement personnel.7 Those attitudes foster norms and legitimacy
Id. at 39.
7 T LER, supra note 22, at 25.
Id. at 48-49.
7. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the strength of retributive and deterrence ration-
ales).
7See AnRES & BRAIT-AITE, supra note 34, at 19-20 (exploring regulatory assump-
tions about corporate actors).
7_ See id. at 27 (suggesting that regulatory "forgiveness is advocated more for its im-
portance in building a commitment to comply in [the] future"); HAINES, supra note
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problems that work against legal compliance. Conversely, new regula-
tory strategies aim to foster self-regulation, voluntary compliance, and
a sense of social responsibility. Cooperative, nonconfrontational ap-
proaches begin enforcement with dialogue and efforts to coax volun-
tary responses, followed only later, for a recalcitrant subgroup, with
warnings, civil sanctions, and criminal prosecution. They strengthen
the legitimacy of the legal rules and social influences that support
them. Regulators and scholars have become increasingly sensitive to
the importance of such informal, nonlegal means of fostering compli-
ance; the goal is to design enforcement strategies that foster social
norms, corporate cultures, and market contexts in which "corporate
virtue" can develop and be maintained.
Street crime policy has not followed anything similar to the re-
formist turn we see in the regulation of white-collar wrongdoing.
States now employ the death penalty at a rate not seen in two genera-
tions.77 Prison populations and incarceration rates have steadily in-
creased for two decades. 8
Mandatory minimum sentences, including harsh recidivist laws,
now govern punishment for many street crimes.' The number of
people in jails and prisons exceeded two million for the first time in
18, at 220 (explaining how regulation can engender "[d]efiant organizations"); Law-
rence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction,
30J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 452 (1993) ("People obey the law more when they
believe it is administered fairly then when they don't."); Yeager, supra note 40, at 138
(linking the attitude of regulatees to the type of violation found).
SeeHolder, supra note 66 (providing guidance on justice Department criteria for
charging corporations with crimes and acknowledging that "management is responsi-
ble for a corporate culture in which criminal conduct is either discouraged or tacitly
encouraged" and "a history of [criminal] conduct may be probative of a corporate cul-
ture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such conduct"); see also HAINES, supra note
18, at 36-40 (discussing policies to encourage firm cultures of "corporate virtue" and
arguing that they vary in likelihood of success).
See, e.g., Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Key Crime &Justice Facts
at a Glance, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance.htm (last modified Feb. 1, 2001)
[hereinafter Key Crime &Justice Facts] (showing that more inmates were executed in
1999 than in any year since the early 1950s).
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (stating
a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for possessing fifty grams of crack cocaine
with intent to distribute and a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for possess-
ing five thousand grams of powder cocaine with intent to distribute); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West 2000) (describing California's three-strikes law); BURE,%U
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE
STATISTICS, 1998 § 5 (reporting sentencing data for federal and state courts); 16B AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 656 (1998) (surveying three-strikes laws and similar recidi-
vist statutes).
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1999, average sentence lengths have increased, and offenders are
more likely to have parole revoked for minor violations.0 In the last
decade, many states have lowered the age by which juvenile offenders
face adult criminal courts and prisons.s ' Furthermore, punitive prose-
cutorial policies, such as the prosecution of pregnant mothers who
expose their fetuses to drugs, demonstrate a commitment to harsh
criminal approaches.>4
Why this distinction in strategies? Common assumptions are that
these are very different types of conduct, harm, and offenders and
thus the, require very different enforcement and punishment strate-
gies. Painting with an overbroad brush, street offenders are outside
the mainstream norms of society. More committed to subcultures or
simply irrational, violent, or greedy, their crimes are clearly inten-
tional. White-collar offenders, on the other hand, except for those
white-collar crimes that plainly mimic street crimes-for example,
embezzling from an employer is stealing and credit card or insurance
fraud are just other forms of theft-are more reasonable, mainstream
people. Their crimes often are unintentional or technical in nature,
thereby allowing white-collar offenders to be dealt with differently
than street criminals. We can negotiate with them, gain their coop-
eration in investigations and self-enforcement plans, deter them with
civil fines, and thereby deal with them more in a regulatory mode
than a criminal one.
In fact, however, many important forms of white-collar wrongdo-
ing are clearly intentional and are covered by criminal statutes with8 3
strong mens rea requirements. There are some structural distinc-
tions that shape divergent enforcement policies, such as offenders'
wealth and the legal identity of firms compared to the nonidentity of
street offenders' contexts, both of which I address below. As the sur-
vey of social phenomena discussed in Part I suggests, however, the two
'" Fox Butterfield, Number in Prison Grows Despite Crime Reduction: Stricter Parole and
.';'ntnchigLaws Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at AO.
,I The Sentencing Project, Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Court: An Assess-
n ut of Ti nds and Consequences (Briefing/Fact Sheet No. 1090), http://
iw.sentencingproject.org/brief/uveniles.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) ("Since
1992, almost every state has made it easier to tryjuveniles as adults.").
,, For a critical description of this strategy employed in two dozen states in the last
decade, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherlwod, 95 MICH. L. REv. 938
(1997).
So- Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Wi6llfulness: An Evolving Theoy of Excus-
able l ooranc, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 342-48 (1998) (describing the judicial trend of inter-
preting federal criminal statutes with "willfulness" mens rea elements, which include
many white-collar offenses, as requiring defendant's knowledge of the law).
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sectors of wrongdoing are more alike than different in the nonlegal
considerations that should drive enforcement; the differences do not
come close to accounting for the sharply divergent enforcement ap-
proaches. Most of the salient distinctions that should prompt strategy
shifts cut across the white-collar/street sectors. Small, economically
marginal firms facing structural pressures toward crime, for instance,
are comparable to subgroups of street offenders for whom coopera-
tive, compliance-fostering prevention strategies may be less appropri-
ate,s but, as argued in Part V, other less punitive strategies may work
well. Wrongdoing in both white-collar and street sectors, however, is
generally responsive to the approaches that increasingly characterize
corporate regulation. The alternative to punitive enforcement im-
poses high social costs in both realms.
Divergent enforcement strategies have more to do with the con-
ceptual choices we make in describing and interpreting wrongdoing.
Those choices have huge consequences for the politics and efficacy of
criminal enforcement policy. Furthermore, they shape our basic con-
ceptions of culpability. I make that case in the following two Parts of
this Article. The next Part unpacks one doctrine-corporate liabil-
ity-that exemplifies these conceptual distinctions between white-
collar and street offending and their consequences. The subsequent
Part offers a broader analysis of conceptual and political forces that
drive white-collar and street policies in unproductively divergent di-
rections.
III. CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CORPORATE LIABILITY
The distinctive strategies we use to address comparable wrongdo-
ing, occurring under comparable social dynamics, have significant
implications for the efficacy of enforcement, the expressive and moral
blaming functions of criminal law, and even the political and social
structure of which punishment is a part. The dominant distinction
between the street and white-collar crime enforcement approaches is
the availability of civil and nonpunitive options in the latter. But to
begin this inquiry, look first at a distinction within criminal law-cor-
porate criminal liability. That doctrine initially appears to increase
84 See Laufer, supra note 8, at 1388 (discussing compliance rates of small firms and
noting that they account for the vast majority of corporate criminal convictions each
year); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (finding that unsuccessful implementation
strategies cause regulatory failures).
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criminal punishment for white-collar offenders, and indeed it can. Its
conceptual premises, however, conflict with traditional criminal law
premises in an important way that strengthens a false distinction
about social influence on criminal actors and, indirectly, helps to sup-
port civil approaches to white-collar wrongdoing.
The doctrine permitting corporate criminal liability is broad, par-
ticularly in federal courts, where most corporate prosecution occurs.
Corporations can be held liable on a respondeat superior theory for
acts of any agents-not merely high-ranking officers-who are acting
within the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the cor-
poration.' Those two qualifications have been interpreted narrowly.
The agent can be motivated partly by other motives, such as personal
gain, and the corporation need not have authorized or overtly en-
couraged the agent's criminal action. Similarly, the corporation need
not actually benefit, as long as its benefit w -as part of the agent's inten-
tion.
Why such breadth for corporate liability? One answer may be
utilitarian in nature. Corporate liability will deter agents' wrongdoing
within the firm, and by putting corporate assets at risk, we give owners
and managers more incentive to monitor agent conduct. That is a
common judicial rationale, and one offered by the justice Department
in its Guidelines for Prosecution of Corporations." That rationale is
weak, however. First, the feasibility of increasing shareholder or offi-
cer monitoring through criminal liability is questionable. Second,
that goal can be fully met with civil liability alone."' Some scholars ar-
gue that corporate liability may even be counterproductive, increasing
crime by discouraging firms themselves from detecting their agents'
.Sce PAMELA H. BuCa, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 992-1005 (2d
ed. 1998) (discussing the criminal liability of corporations and corporate executives);
Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counse; 40 BUS.
L\w. 129, 131 & n.ll (1984) (charting the development of the doctrine through case
law); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liabil-
itgV, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1102-05 (1991) (comparing the two current standards of
corporate criminal liability. the respondeat superior approach and the Model Penal
Code approach); Holder, supra note 66 ("Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a
corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts of its directors, officers, employ-
ees, and agents.").
" &o Holder, supra note 66.
,,7 SeeDaniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321
(1996) ("At best, the case for corporate criminal liability must rest on the need to cor-
rect .ome deficiency in the system of civil liability. But a close look at the cases reveals
no such deficiency most of the time."); Mann, supra note 3, at 1797-98 (noting the pro-
liferation of civil punitive damages as a means to punish and deter).
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wrongdoing and thereby increasing their own liability. '
Moreover, a corporation is merely people joined in voluntary, co-
operative ventures. Behaviorally, though not legally, a firm is much
like many other coordinated, group endeavors in which some people
influence others. There is no obvious reason why we need tools in the
corporate setting to address some individuals' influence on others be-
yond what criminal law already provides. Criminal law has well estab-
lished ways to address conduct that wrongly compels others to commit
crimes-for example, liability for coercion and duress defenses-or
wrongly encourages or aids others in crime commission-for exam-
ple, complicity and accomplice liability. And when another's influ-
ence on an actor's conduct falls short of complicity-such as taunting,
badgering, or threatening disassociation from group membership-
no liability follows, even though it may be a real influence. Even more
firmly established is the rule that courts will not assess liability for fail-
ing to discourage or prevent others from committing crimes, or for
not reducing their opportunities to do soy. Yet the utilitarian func-
tion of corporate liability does just that.
In that sense, corporate liability is a somewhat odd weapon within
the traditional criminal doctrine. It assumes that those actors sur-
rounding the agent-perpetrator, making up the relevant social context
in which she commits crime, are a critical influence on the agent and
yet are not aiders-abettors. These actors not only influence the agent
to a degree that could change his conduct and prevent his crime;
their influence, or responsibility to exercise it, is so significant that it
deserves to be governed by criminal liability. Some of that influence
may be of the sort covered by the complicity doctrine, but it does not
have to be in order to incur liability for the firm. It is liability for be-
ing a social influence at a level below complicity.
The doctrine thus gives stronger attention to the organizational or
social context of criminal conduct than elsewhere in criminal law.
Holding a corporation rather than individuals liable for crimes sug-
gests that the target for both retributive blame and utilitarian deter-
88 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liabili,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (pointing to the introduction of corporate en-
forcement costs as a source of increased corporate crime).
89 SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 9.06[A], at 86 (2d ed.
1995) ("Subject to a few limited exceptions, a person has no criminal law duty to res-
cue or render aid to another person in peril, even if the person imperiled may lose her
life in the absence of assistance."); A.D. Woozley, A Duty To Rescue: Some Thoughts on
Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1983) (arguing in favor of making failure to give
aid to persons in physical danger an offense).
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rence is not, or at least not solely, the individual, but the social context
that influenced him to carry out criminal activity. The doctrine rec-
ognizes that social settings can be "criminogenic." They tend to foster
or produce criminal behavior and can also reduce it. Those responsi-
ble for that context share the blame. With corporate liability, the as-
signment of culpability is muddied in a way that it is not in street
crime. While not excusing the individual actor, corporate liability
blames those who influenced him as well."'" It acknowledges that re-
sponsibility, in some settings at least, is not fully captured by the
model of individual moral agency that underlies traditional criminal
law.
This is not an argument against corporate liability. Rather, the
point is that the doctrine of corporate liability is a unique acknowl-
edgment of the relevance of social norms and influence on indidu-
als' criminal conduct. It implies that, to prevent crime, we need to di-
rect liability not only at the individual actor, but at the social context
in which she acts-the social context that shares responsibility for her
criminal conduct. Once a crime is committed, the expression of so-
cial disapproval is justly directed at those contributing to the social
context as well as the individual. And if social context is a target for
deterrence efforts as well as blame, then a better understanding of
how contexts work might prompt us to find effective nonpunitive pre-
vention strategies that work better. That opens the door for newer
regulatory strategies.
Described that way, it is easy to see how corporate liability con-
trasts with concepts underlying the law of traditional street crime.
Our most troubled and stressed communities, particularly in inner cit-
ies, are surely as criminogenic as the worst firms that incur corporate
liability."' Yet, we do not give the same weight to social influence on
street offenders as corporate criminal offenders. Perversely, corporate
settings provide wrongdoers with a more persuasive explanation for
their conduct than poor community settings provide for street of-
fenders, and that explanation diffuses responsibility beyond the indi-
vidual to a second responsible player. The literature on social norms
- Yet, it creates the prospect of a practical shift in liability that, in a limited sense,
mimics a formal excuse. Corporate liability provides the government with another tar-
get for criminal liability in the firm, in addition to the agents-an alternative una-ail-
able to street offenders. While the practice does not appear to be widespread, it allows
for the firm instead of the indiduals to be held liable."I See. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 12841 (1995) (outlining criminal defense patterns by race and social con-
text); Sampson & Wilson, supra note 17, at 37 (providing inner-city criminal statistics).
20011 1319
1320 UNlIERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 149:1295
emphasizes that social influence explains much criminal conduct.
21
Yet there is a practical barrier in that there is no organized entity, no
legal-fiction person, to hold liable for the community's influence on
street offenders. That is one of the few structural distinctions to ex-
plain the different treatment of comparable social influences on street
and white-collar wrongdoing, even though such influence in the street
context is clearly as strong, and thus as blameworthy, as in the corpo-
rate realm.
We could, however, take a lesson from corporate liability for street
crime. While we cannot hold street offenders' communities or peer
groups liable as entities, we can recognize the influence of those
groups by devising other enforcement strategies that acknowledge the
effect of social influence on street wrongdoing. We largely do not
make such a recognition, however, and that distinction in practice be-
tween street and corporate enforcement leads us to repress social in-
fluence in the street crime context. The doctrinal distinction distrib-
utes liability differently among individuals in different settings who
are subject to comparable social influence. Because we have no ready
alternative, no legal entity, on which to spread blame, we downplay
the significance of that influence and thus of responsible agents be-
yond the individual. Our operative conception of the street offender
is of an atomistic, free-willed actor whose choices to commit crimes
are her responsibility alone; the circumstances and influences that
explain and predict her conduct are morally, as well as doctrinally, ir-
relevant.9 In contrast, our moral-conceptual image of corporate
wrongdoing builds on a premise of actors as social beings and ac-
knowledges that culpability should properly be broader than the indi-
vidual alone. , In this way, we construct a notion of street offenders as
92 See Kahan, supra note 11, at 350; Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1998) ("[T he structure of the community in which an individual
lives interacts in important ways to either facilitate or retard that individual's criminal
or delinquent behavior.").
q3 I discuss some nascent efforts and additional proposals in infra Part V that fit this
description.
94 The U.S. Supreme Court made an analogous conceptual move in McCleskV t.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). There, the Court accepted social science studies that
found strong correlations between race, defendants, victims, and the imposition of the
death penalty. Id. at 293. But because the defendant could not link the evidence of
those patterns to how such bias actually occurred in his case, the Court deemed the
evidence irrelevant for equal protection purposes. Id.
9i For a terrific description of how allocations of responsibility depend upon alter-
native conceptions of the self that emphasize or repress social connections and con-
text, see Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 968-77. For a practical example of how such al-
ternative conceptions play out in public debate about criminal responsibilit in
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more culpable because we emphasize their isolated individual choices
and repress acknowledgment of any social influence.
Criminal law theory has occasionally toyed with the social deprav-
ity defense to recognize the reality of social influence on street of-
fenders. The defense would allow one's guilt to be partially or fully
excused because one came from a "rotten social background" in
which social influence encouraging crime was widespread, social capi-
tal discouraging it scarce, and structural pressures toward committing
it great.' If we take social influence seriously, the defense poses the
question whether we can judge individuals who come from communi-
ties that differ radically in the influence they exert for or against law-
abidingness under the same standard.
We do indeed take such influence seriously sometimes. The em-
pirical correlation of street crime rates in different communities with
social capital indicators is irrefutable. Accordingly, it has become a
much-touted basis for street crime prevention strategies."7 In the cor-
porate context, social influence underlies not only corporate liability,
but also charging leniency and sentence reductions for firms that dis-
courage crime with formal compliance plans, representing efforts to
shape social influence and capital. ' The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
provide corporations a substantial discount if, at the time of the
crimes carried out by agents, they had in place an internal plan for
minimizing law-breaking and maximizing regulatory compliance.? In
corporate and street settings, see Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime, Jus-
ti', and the Savings and Loan Crisis, in BEYOND THE LkW: CRIME IN COMPLEX
ORGVNIZATIONS 247 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993), which documents the widespread em-
phasis on structural explanations for savings and loans crimes in contrast to street
crime offenses that emphasize individual moral choice.
Compaic David L. Bazelon, The Morality of Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385,
389 (1976) (arguing that poor life circumstances should excuse crime), and Richard
Delgado, "Rotten Social Background" Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Envirmnmental Deprivation ?, 3 J.L. & INEQUALITY 9 (1985) (arguing for an excuse based
on poor life circumstances), with TONRY, supra note 91, at 134-48 (responding to Del-
gadu and arguing against such an excuse), and Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1251-52 (1976) (arguing
against such a life circumstance excuse).
See nfia Part V (discussing the "broken windcows" theory and community polic-
ing).
- S' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES NLMNUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (1998) ("Cul-
pability generally will be determined by the steps taken by the organization prior to the
offense to prevent and detect criminal conduct .... "); Laufer, supra note 8, at 1386
(describing federal sentencing guidelines policies that provide discounts for compli-
ance plans); Holder, supra note 66 (outlining factors to be considered in charging a
corporation).
". U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 (1998); Laufer, supra note 8, at
1389.
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fact, corporations can gain an advantage if they merely devise such a
plan after the crime-during the course of plea negotiations.' Some
critique the compliance-plan provisions as creating perverse re-
sponses."" The premise of these provisions, however, again enacts the
social influence theory: one deserves less punishment if one tried to
change positively the social contexts in which crime occurs because
that social influence accounts for part of why actors opted to do
crimes. As a crime prevention strategy, this is unremarkable. As a ba-
sis for adjusting culpability, it is unusual.
In practice, the social depravity defense is infeasible. As a practi-
cal matter, we cannot workably define "community" or "background"
for purposes of the defense. Even if this were possible, the defense
would perversely encourage unlawfulness precisely where we most
need to discourage it. Further, the defense would force us to define
the impossible lines of what Bernard Williams calls "constitutive
luck"-the fortuities of birth and social life circumstances that greatly
influence who we are and what we do.'" We must ignore much varia-
tion in luck to make any moral judgments at all, and we cannot fully
compensate for variations before doing so. The question, then, is
when and how much constitutive luck will play a role in responsibility
ascriptions. Formally at least, criminal law, with some important ex-
ceptions, mostly ignores the social context in which an actor acts; ' it
proceeds on the assumption of full autonomy to choose courses of
conduct so that an actor can be judged morally blameworthy.' "' In
fact, as I argue below, we sometimes account for such social influences
through enforcement discretion, but not in a way that diminishes the
distinction between how we recognize it in street and corporate crime
100 Laufer, supra note 8, at 1389-90; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 8A1.2 (1998).
101 Laufer, supra note 8, at 1405 (discussing the moral hazards and perverse incen-
tives of compliance).
102 BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 20-22 (1981); Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at
983.
103 In addition to corporate liability, battered woman syndrome is arguably an ex-
ample here, as are some emerging cultural defenses or culture-based mitigation evi-
dence. See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multi-
culturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1995)
(providing an overview of the debate on cultural defense in the case of battered
woman syndrome).
104 Kyron Huigens's recent work on a virtue ethics theory of criminal law suggests
that we account for offenders' contexts and circumstances in the adjudication process,
particularly in jury judgments, more than formal criminal law implies. See Huigens,
supra note 1, at 1016-31.
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settings.
Corporate liability avoids the problems of the depravity defense by
working as a supplemental form of liability rather than an affirmative
defense. It may even give some offenders some of the benefits of a de-
fense. Corporate liability adds another defendant to the mix of bar-
gaining with the government, which can aid an individual, at least to
the extent prosecutors forgo individual prosecutions to pursue the
corporation or offer agents leniency in exchange for cooperation in
the case against the entity. While prosecuting firms without also going
after individuals is uncommon, bargaining is not.
More fundamentally, while corporate liability is a disadvantage for
white-collar offenders because it makes additional liability possible,
the doctrine ends up supporting an important conceptual distinction
between street and corporate crime practice that works to the advan-
tage of white-collar offenders. By positioning white-collar crime
uithin a special space of criminal law that accepts social influence
premises, corporate liability supports ideas about both the nature of
offenders and of the crime that move white-collar practice away from
the most punitive forms of criminal justice practice and toward a more
civil, regulatory model of addressing urongdoing and social harm.
IV. THE POLITICAL PONVER OF CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS:
DETERRENCE VERSUS RETRIBUTVE RATIONALES
A. The Force of Retributivism and Deterrence Rationales
The structural distinction of having a legal entity to stand for so-
cial context in commercial settings but not in street settings is one
impetus for the greater emphasis on social influence in white-collar
crime. But the conceptual distinctions implicit in corporate liability
are more of a signal than a force for the divergence in street and cor-
porate crime policy. That divergence is fostered by the rhetorical
modes that dominate debate of these two criminal law sectors. Crimi-
nal law has long traditions of both retributivist and consequentialist
premises. Street crime law maintains a relatively stronger emphasis on
moral culpability and expressive condemnation. Corporate crime pol-
icy, in contrast, takes place more in a deterrence mode. This distinc-
tion in organizing rationales has significant implications for criminal
justice policy choices. It supports a division that keeps street crime
policy oriented toward dysfunctional models that emphasize criminal
sanctions, while corporate crime policy is oriented toward a regulatory
model in which criminal law plays a significant but supporting role.
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Consequentialist arguments have gained ground in criminal law,
as they have in legal thought generally, in large part due to the rise of
economic analysis. °5 Dan Kahan has recently described how the op-
posed rhetorical modes of deterrence and expressive condemnation
function politically in criminal law discourse.' °6 Deterrence serves to
suppress the emotional and political content of criminal law's mean-
ing, while expressive condemnation puts that content front and cen-
ter, making it the object of heated political debate. Deterrence rheto-
ric cools passions-it sounds like rational policy talk.'" 7  Expressive
rhetoric heats passions-it is a tool in the battle over which political
and moral values criminal law will serve. 0 8
The deterrence-expressiveness modulation occurs not only
through time, as political disagreement grows or diminishes with re-
gard to criminal law; it also occurs across the landscape of substantive
criminal law. Criminal law's unique feature is its moral expressiveness
and the traditional background of thinking about criminal law's ex-
pressive meaning is street crime. The dominant responses for wrong-
doing on the street are the death penalty, the wide support for im-
prisonment evident in longer sentences and prison construction
rates,' and the lower ages at which youthful offenders are punished
as adults. In an earlier work, Kahan has described why alternative
sanctions-for example, fines or community service instead of
prison-are insufficiently expressive of the moral condemnation that
society desires in a criminal judgment, and thus lack popular support
as substitutes for prison."0  Sanford Kadish long ago worried that
criminal law's expressive content would be diminished if applied to
105 See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and
the Ciminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 CEO. L.J. 775, 784-85 (1997) (exploring intellec-
tual challenges to the civil-criminal distinction).
10 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
107 Id. at 427-35.
108 See id. at 419-35 (comparing expressive condemnation and deterrence princi-
ples).
109 Despite its origins as an institution designed to reform and rehabilitate offend-
ers, see DAvID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 157-92 (1990) (reviewing
historical studies on the functions of imprisonment), the dominant contemporary
purpose of incarceration is clearly to shame or to condemn, as well as to incapacitate,
see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996)
(describing the social meaning of criminal punishments including prison terms, fines,
and shaming sanctions).
110 See Kahan, supra note 109, at 592 (explaining that the political unacceptability
of alternative sanctions reflects their inadequacy along the expressive dimension of
punishment).
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economic crimes."' All this suggests that, while we use deterrence
rhetoric sometimes in street crime discussions, an expressive and re-
tributive moralism drives policymaking. Retributivism accords with
the individualistic, autonomous view of street offenders, free of con-
text, that we described in contrast to corporate liability premises." 
2
Corporate criminal law, in contrast, operates firmly in a deter-
rence mode. Corporate criminal law is part of an elaborate regulatory
regime governing firms and commercial activity, and utilitarian think-
ing is the overwhelmingly dominant mode of analysis for administra-
tive law. The deterrence framework has a couple of implications for
corporate criminal law. The first is related to the one Kahan identifies
more broadly-deterrence talk cools passions about the political con-
tent of corporate criminal law."' It thereby helps to take political con-
tention and moral outrage about such crimes off the table of public
debate because it chills moral evaluation of wrongdoing in commer-
cial settings. This is not to say, of course, that it is a foolproof means
for doing so, as the savings and loan scandal of a decade ago boiled
over into a public debate carried out in expressive idioms."'
Additionally, deterrence rhetoric implies that defendants are ra-
tional, reasonable actors who can be expected to respond sensibly to
incentives."' This is one reason why, for corporate wrongdoing, civil
sanctions often seem appropriate substitutes for criminal sanctions.
When all we are trying to do is deter bad conduct and foster socially
desirable behavior, a civil fine can prompt a rational response from
actors as well as a criminal one.
Yet the rational actor implicit in the deterrence model adopts in a
subtle way the social-being view of corporate actors noted above."6 If
M See S.,NFORD H. KADISH, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regu-
lationis, in BLlME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 40 (1987) (outlining
the special characteristics of economic regulatory legislation relevant to the use of
criminal sanctions and discussing their implications).
: See supra text accompanying note 104.
11 Kahan, supra note 106, at 427-35.
For an overview of that debate, see Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 247.
As noted above, however, regulation has moved to a more sophisticated model
of human behavior that acknowledges, for instance, resentment and resistance to en-
forcement efforts. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
1,, Note that the atomistic, free-willed actor model identified as the working prem-
ise for street offenders is not necessarily an assumption of a fully rational actor-that is
one assumption sometimes used when talking about street crime punishments, such as
prison or capital punishment, in deterrence terms. But we can just as easily assume
street offenders are free-willed, yet irrational and driven by destructive passions and
impulses. For them deterrence is ineffective, but moral blame is appropriate.
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we are dealing with rational actors who we nonetheless recognize as
vulnerable to social influence, then the incentives we set up for them
should include factors present in their social setting. Thus, while the
incentives we impose on street criminals are traditional punishments
that also carry expressions of moral opprobrium, the options for cor-
porate actors expand to include the much wider array of civil regula-
tory tools that not only punish, as civil fines do, but also change the
offender's social environment to make offending less possible and less
likely. For instance, sanctions can take the form not only of tradi-
tional punishments like fines, but of voluntary pollution-reducing pro-
jects, reporting requirements, and other "enforced self-regulation""'
or "partial-industry intervention" mandates." These strategies change
how offenders do the activity that led to crime in the first place, and
they change the environment in which it is done by increasing super-
vision. That there is little objection to the lack of expressive power in
such sanctions as pollution-reduction projects speaks to how thor-
oughly deterrence concerns trump retributive ones for white-collar
wrongdoing. Contrast the problem with the social meaning of crimi-
nal probation and community service that Kahan identified. '' Both
are activities that good citizens, rather than criminals, do and so they
imply no public shame or condemnation.
117 See Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796, 24,799-801 (May 5, 1998) (listing categories of acceptable supplemental envi-
ronmental projects); Dana, supra note 44, at 1184-91 (describing substitution of "sup-
plemental environmental projects" in lieu of fines as an EPA enforcement strategy). A
Bureau ofJustice Statistics Special Report found that in 1997 the EPA negotiated 266
environmental projects with a total value of S85.4 millon. John Scalia, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Federal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 1997, Nov. 1999, at 3, available at
http://w.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/feel97.pdf. Relatedly, the EPA achieved in-
junctive remedies in 3735 actions that required elimination of noncompliant conduct
and environmental restoration, estimated to value $1.9 billion. Id.
118 See, e.g., REES, supra note 33, at 9-10, 30-37, 154-71 (discussing self-regulation in
workplace safety); Steinzor, supra note 68 (reviewing "reinvention" of environmental
regulation, including self-regulation to replace "command-and-control" regulation).
AYR9 s & BRArrI-HAITE, supra note 34, at 101-57 (describing both self-regulation
and partial-industry intervention).
See Kahan, supra note 109, at 591 ("[F]or those who commit serious criminal
offenses, the law strongly prefers one form of suffering-the deprivation of liberty-to
the near exclusion of all others.").
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B. SliftiingEnforcement fron Judging Culpability to Fostering Compliance
1. Civil Sanctions and Culpability
As the comparison of deterrence and retributive rationales dis-
cussed above suggests, when consequentialism dominates policies ad-
dressing Tongdoing and social harm, prevention and restitution
goals take priority over judgments of culpability. Corporate regula-
tion practice has responded to, and even led, scholarly literature criti-•• 121
cal of command-and-control punitiveness. Street crime regulation,
with the exception of community policing strategies discussed further
below,1 ' has been largely impervious to scholarly assessment or to re-
form strategies that have affected comparable areas of public policy.
An extensive regulatory regime to address corporate wrongdo-
ing-civil and administrative fines, restitution orders, injunctions, and
other forms of creative remedies-can take the place of criminal sanc-
tions covering the same conduct and serving the same deterrence
goals.L-? Agencies have even pushed the limits of statutory authority to
innovate voluntary, nonpunitive remedies. 24  The Justice Depart-
ment's guidelines on prosecution of corporations explicitly adopt this
view-adequate civil responses are ajustification for forgoing criminal
charges_' Parallel statutory regimes providing civil and criminal sanc-
U' Ste AIRES & BrXITFnVAITE, supra note 34, at 20 (arguing that regulators moved
before scholars in seeing cooperative compliance strategies as superior to deterrence
strategies based on punitive sanctions).
' See infia Part V.A (noting that community policing policies vary from punitive to
cooperative in their approach).
--, This distinction was the basis for Edwin Sutherland's landmark work initially
describing, and coining the phrase, white-collar crime. Sutherland complained that
serious harms perpetrated by firms and high-status individuals were not labeled as de-
viant and were treated as regulatory rather than criminal matters, while comparable or
lesser harms done by low-status people were considered deviant. EDwIN H.
SUTHERIAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (Yale Univ. Press 1983)
(1949) (defining a "[w]hite collar crime ... approximately as a crime committed by a
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation"). White-
collar criminal law has expanded dramatically since Sutherland's early work in the
I 940s, but so has regulator), law. There still remains a huge body of civil and adminis-
trative law that applies to white-collar crime for which there is no parallel for street
crime.
U1 Se Farber, supra note 42, at 310-11 (describing the EPA's "supplemental envi-
ronmental project" settlements, used in lieu of monetary penalties, as an example of a
practice that "seem[ed] dubious at the time in formal terms" but was subsequently
"partially ratified by Congress").
1-,. See FCA GUIDMNCE, supra note 59, at 460.61 (suggesting thatJustice Department
attorne)s should consider alternative remedies before instituting civil fraud actions
against health care providers and other corporate offenders); Holder, supra note 66, at
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tions for essentially the same conduct exist in virtually every area of
white-collar wrongdoing, including health care fraud,'2" environ-
mental harms,"' workplace safety, and securities law."8 This is so de-
spite the fact that, contrary to industry arguments, many white-collar
criminal statutes govern conduct that unambiguously fits the tradi-
tional character of crimes. Health care fraud, money laundering,
tax crime, and environmental statutes, for example, all have strong
scienter requirements that prevent conviction for innocent conduct or
for honest mistakes arising from unclear regulatory requirements.'"'
Statutes governing health care fraud typically require either knowl-
edge of false or fraudulent conduct or "willful" conduct, an element
that has been read to require proof that the offender knew that the
conduct was illegal.1
3 '
Part IIA8 (noting that the adequacy of noncriminal remedies should be considered
when conducting an investigation into corporate conduct).
126 TIMOTHY S. JosT & SHARON DAvIEs, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND
ABUSE §§ 2-2, 2-3, 2-5 (2001-02 ed. 2000); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994) (articulating
civil penalties for defrauding the government); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) to (b) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997) (articulating the felony provision for willful fraudulent conduct in the
health care context).
127 Dana, supra note 44, at 1184; see also EPA, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT FY 1996, at 2-7 (1996) (documenting great use
of civil penalties in settlements); Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental
Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781, 791-95 (1991) (summarizing key
criminal environmental statutes).
128 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that a person who
trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated
in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, is guilty of violating
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act); Lynch, supra note 2, at 23-24
("[I]n cases arising under the securities laws... there is often no distinction between
what the prosecutor would have to prove to establish a crime and what the relevant
administrative agency or private plaintiff would have to prove to show civil liability.").
M For examples of such industry arguments regarding health care fraud crimes
and a response to them, see Jost & Davies, supra note 29; in the context of financial
crime, see Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 95.
130 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (holding that the money
laundering statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994), requires knowledge that the act is unlaw-
ful); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (holding that the federal tax
evasion statute, I.R.C. § 7201 (1994), requires proof that the defendant intentionally
violated a "known legal duty"); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that "knowing" mens rea of a Clean Water Act felony provision,
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1994), applies to every element of the crime); Hanlester Net-
work v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Medicare anti-kickback
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994), requires proof of knowledge of the law); Da-
vies, supra note 83, at 342-49, 361-96 (discussing willfulness requirements in these and
other federal statutes).
131 Jost & Davies, supra note 29, at 293-305; see also Hanlester Network, 51 F.3d at
1400; Davies, supra note 83, at 343-47.
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These parallel regimes for white-collar wrongdoing stand in sharp
contrast to the enforcement options available for street wrongdoing,
and that difference has led to distinct approaches to enforcement dis-
cretion for conduct in each realm that could be prosecuted crimi-
nally. The disparate approaches greatly affect whether knowing or
willful conduct that can be prosecuted criminally actually will be
prosecuted. Much of the practice of enforcement discretion hinges
on deterrence and restitution concerns. Prosecutors and regulators
rarely let significant, knowing violations go without any response, but
a response need not be a criminal sanction if civil alternatives exist.
The factors used in the Justice Department's corporate prosecution
guidelines spell out how private prevention strategies, such as firm
compliance plans, and civil sanctions can justify forgoing criminal
prosecution.' - In health care fraud, the Justice Department explicitly
urges alternative remedies before seeking civil liability under the False
Claims Act ("FCA"),' and it ovenhelmingly uses civil FCA liability in-
stead of criminal statutes covering the same conduct.TM  The same is
true in the enironmental context, in which civil fines far outnumber
criminal fines, voluntary settlements recently have become common
in lieu of some civil fines, and U.S. Attorneys decline prosecution at
much higher rates than for other Nrongdoing.'3 5
When consequentialist concerns drive enforcement discretion
even for conduct that, within the criminal law's terms, merits a decla-
1' See Holder, supra note 66 (suggesting that prosecutors weigh the adequacy of
noncriminal approaches prior to pursuing criminal charges).
FCA GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at 460-61.
'-' Jost & Davies, supra note 29, at 285, 306-12 (describing civil and criminal sanc-
tions for false claims and discussing why the government often settles civil cases for
well below statutory penalty amounts).
I- For a discussion about environmental settlements between polluters and the
EPA, see Dana, supra note 44, at 1185-91. As for prosecutorial declination rates, in
1997, U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute 61% of matters investigated for environ-
mental protection offenses. Scalia, supra note 117, at 4. The declination rate was 70%
for organizational suspects and 55% for individuals. Id. In contrast, the overall decli-
nation rate for matters investigated by U.S. attorneys was 27.2% (with wide variation
for categories of crime: 18.1% for drug crimes, 33.0% for violent crimes, and 63.9%
for regulatory offenses). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 1998: WITH TRENDS 1982-98, at 8 tbl.2 (1999),
http://www.ojp.utsdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp98.pdf. This broad comparison can be
only suggestive. Cases are declined for many reasons, and such a range in declination
rates might be explained in part by the various environmental matters investigated as
compared to other matters, such as drug cases. It may be, for example, that evidence
is weaker generally in environmental cases than in drug cases, justifying more declina-
tion on those grounds. The Bureau ofJustice Statistics data cited here give no basis for
assessing those possibilities.
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ration of moral culpability, retribution becomes merely one concern
that can be outweighed by others. Criminal law has a deterrent role,
but compared to well-developed administrative law regimes it looks
like a pretty crude means to encourage compliance. It is easy to see
how appealing civil options can be for deterrence. We use criminal
law for utilitarian ends only because we have not fashioned civil alter-
natives. 1 6 When civil alternatives exist, the downsides of criminal law,
such as costly procedural burdens, the stigmatizing effects that imper-
fectly match views of culpability, and the resentment that undercuts
commitment to compliance, become more acute. Within much of
white-collar practice, we preserve criminal law for the most egregious
instances of knowing and harmful conduct-those in which the re-
tributive and expressive function of criminal law become clearly nec-137
essary. This explains the criminal law's continuing, and even grow-
ing, role in white-collar contexts in the last two decades, even as the
trend in regulation overall has been toward minimizing punitive,
command-and-control strategies. ' 8 As a broad generalization, policy
on white-collar wrongdoing has remedied its deficiency of too little
criminal law for culpable conduct-Sutherland's original point half a
century ago" --while at the same time moving toward a nonpunitive
strategy of prevention and enforcement dominated by civil law. 4'
Offenders' wealth plays a role in shaping this dynamic. White-
collar offenders are generally wealthier. As a consequence, white-
collar criminals are harder for the government to pursue because they
136 In theory, either form can deter equally, but civil sanctions come without the
burdensome procedural requirements of criminal adjudication. For examples of utili-
tarian arguments that suggest that civil sanctions fully substitute for criminal sanctions,
see Fischel & Sykes, supra note 87; V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: Whqat Pur-
poseDoes lt Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1497 (1996).
137 Yet even for this purpose, civil alternatives compete. See infra Part V (demon-
strating the contingency of criminal sanctions even for culpable past conduct). This is
not to say that white-collar statutes do not criminalize some conduct that is marginal in
terms of moral culpability. My point here is a broad generalization that emphasizes
white-collar contexts in which there is also an extensive civil or regulatory regime. For
an argument that white-collar statutes criminalize much conduct that is arguably inno-
cent or marginally culpable, see William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-
Criminal Line, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 13-14,32 (1996).
i: See, e.g., Adler & Lord, supra note 127, at 790 (noting the increased use of
criminal prosecution for environmental violations since the late 1980s and urging fur-
ther use); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Prac-
tice in the Federal Courts, 1988-90, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247 (1991) (discussing increases in
corporate sentencing).
139 Sutherland, supra note 123.
14) See Laufer, supra note 8, at 1344 n.1, 1382-86 (noting that large firms over-
whelmingly face civil and administrative, rather than criminal, proceedings).
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can raise enforcement costs with vigorous legal defenses starting early
in investigations."' Also, as William Stuntz has noted, wealth buys pri-
vacy, which greatly raises enforcement costs. 4 2 Yet wealth also makes
people and entities open to regulations and sanctions other than tra-
ditional criminal punishments. 4 1 Wealth thus gives enforcement offi-
cials more choices for responding to wrongdoing.
Even when white-collar conduct is culpable, enforcement officials
are less compelled to enforce criminal laws against lawbreakers who
can make full restitution for substantial harms and who can be de-
tened by big fines and other serious civil sanctions, such as defendant-
financed monitoring of future behavior or license suspension. When
the utilitarian functions of criminal law are fulfilled by civil alterna-
tives, and some moderate expressive-blaming component is part of the
civil remedy-for example, punitive fines or public acknowledgment
of violation-the pressure for criminal sanctions diminishes.'4' In this
sense, criminal culpability is contingent on civil alternatives to crimi-
nal law. The key arguments left for criminal punishment-retribution
or expressive condemnation-are undermined by regulators' sensitiv-
ity to consequentialist concerns, such as the alienating, resentment-
fostering effects of punishment that reduce future compliance and
cooperation.
For street crime, offenders' relative (or literal) poverty makes civil
remedies that diffuse the need for criminal sanctions seem much less
available. Poor people typically cannot make restitution, pay substan-
tial fines, or finance monitoring of their future conduct."5 Civil for-
feiture now plays a large role in more lucrative forms of street crime,
M ,i S,,gtnerally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF
AIoNE,S AT WORK (1985) (describing major themes in white-collar defense, includ-
ing proxiding strategies and understanding clients).U Stuntz, supra note 24, at 1823-24; see also William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of
Ioutlh ,'mndment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1265 (1999) (noting that the law af-
lords a graded protection of privacy, especially with respect to wealth).
W Examples of other regulations include professional license revocations or pro-
hibitions from lucrative business markets, such as government contracting in the de-
fense or health care sectors. For a description of a recent example, see Kurt Eichen-
wald, HCA to Pav $95 Million in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at C1 (noting
that being barred from participation in Medicare is automatic for firms convicted of
deflauding the program). Other sorts of sanctions include reputational injuries and
public shame that arise from public knowledge of Tongdoing. On shame in white-
collar contexts, see Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming 11hite-Collar Criminals: A
Proposalfor Puform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999).
" Khanna, supra note 136, at 1509; Mann, supra note 3, at 1864-73.
An example of such monitoring could be electronic surveillance from an ankle
bracelet, which courts typically make defendants finance.
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especially drug crimes, but it does not match the efficacy of civil and
administrative alternatives for corporate conduct. 46 In addition, its
draconian severity seems designed more to punish and alienate than
to remedy. 47 Street offenders' poverty indirectly increases the per-
ceived need for criminal condemnation by limiting alternatives to it.
2. Social Costs as Mediators of Sanction Options
Deterrence goals are not the only consequentialist concerns that
factor into enforcement decisions and distinguish policy choices in
white-collar and street settings. Recall the significant social costs that
always accompany criminal punishment, and some white-collar civil
sanctions as well, that are imposed on offenders and third parties in
their communities."" These social costs differentially affect prosecu-
tion decisions. In white-collar contexts, such as health care fraud, the
government explicitly weighs not only deterrence goals and the of-
fender's knowledge or harm she caused, but also the impact that pun-
ishment may have on those linked to the offender, such as communi-
ties served by a health care provider who committed fraud."'
Similarly, prosecuting a corporation for environmental or workplace
safety, price-fixing, or accounting fraud'5 will have recognized, and
politically salient, collateral effects on workers, local communities, or
shareholders. These social costs counsel for civil rather than criminal
sanctions, or against greater rather than lesser penalties."
The social cost concerns in white-collar crime enforcement are le-
gitimate, but comparable ones in street crime enforcement get much
less recognition and thus mediate enforcement policy less. Fagan and
1 For a critical description of current forfeiture practices, see Eric Blumenson &
Eva Nilsen, PolicingforProfit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
35 (1998).
147 Id. at 81-82; see also United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 315 (1996) (Stevens,J.,
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that civil forfeiture of claimant's home for grow-
ing marijuana is "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause); Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993) (explaining that civil forfeiture can be "punish-
ment" under the Excessive Fines Clause).
148 See supra Part I.C (discussing the importance of acknowledging social capital's
impact in the context of criminal sanctions).
149 FCA GUIDANcE, supra note 59, at 460-61; Jost & Davies, supra note 29, at 285,
312.
1 See Norris & Henriques, supra note 20 (describing guilty pleas in the "largest
and longest accounting fraud in history, continuing at least 12 years and costing ines-
tors $19 billion").
5 Holder, supra note 66; see also Alexander, supra note 58 (describing the social
costs to third parties of corporate crime).
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Meares, among others, have documented the extensive injuries to
communities from aggressive criminal prosecution coupled with long
incarceration policies. For example, families dependent on offenders
for income or child care lose providers, offenders lose future em-
ployment prospects due to prison records, and communities lose the
social capital that is the most effective tool for crime prevention and
fighting poverty. 5 2 Fagan and Meares have pointed out that commu-
nity members confront these costs by mediating their "multiple roles"
and "linked fate" with offenders-they suffer both from offenders'
crime and punishment, so they may resist harsh punishment as the
worse of two harms."
The offenders' wrongdoing in corporate and street settings can-
not be distinguished on retributivist grounds; many offenders in both
sectors commit knowing or willful violations that cause substantial
harm. "'4 Instead, it is other factors, including civil alternatives and the
recognition of social costs, that explain distinct enforcement practices.
Criminal liability is contingent on its alternatives, as well as on the po-
litical salience of the ancillary costs of punishment.
We miss the salience of the costs that Meares describes in part be-
cause we downplay the connection between street offenders and their
communities compared to corporate agents and their firms, or even
firms and their market sectors. The ignorance of this connection
skews utilitarian analyses of the effects of punishment.
Notice, for example, that the social costs of street crime enforce-
ment on communities work, in a limited sense, as an equivalent of
corporate liability. We risk generating the same perverse effects as
firm liability sometimes can. Jennifer Arlen has described how corpo-
rate liability can undermine deterrent efforts aimed at firms.'5' Arlen
argues that corporate liability could lead firms to lessen their own ef-
" Fagan & Meares, supra note 27, at Part IV; see also supra Part I.C.
SSee Fagan & Meares, supra note 27, at Part Rv (discussing why African-Americans
in particular have multiple reasons to hold complex views about the increase in pun-
ishment); see also Meares, supra note 92, at 669-70 (noting that community-level struc-
tures mediate individual factors often connected with crime); Stuntz, supra note 24, at
1797 (discussing Meares's analysis and survey data showing that African-Americans op-
pose both drug legalization and harsh enforcement policies).
J1 It is easy, in fact, to calculate greater harm from extensive fraud, pollution, or
workplace dangers than drug use and distribution, burglary, or car or property theft.
SteJONES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 9 (1998) ("The crimes we do know about are so huge, and their consequences
so devastating, that they dw&af any known street crimes."); TONY G. POVEDA,
RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 10-15 (1994).
- Set, Arlen, supra note 88, at 833.
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forts, which include enforcement costs for the firm, to detect their
agents' wrongdoing because they may end up paying more in criminal
fines and enforcement costs than they save by preventing crime with
rigorous monitoring efforts.15 We can view a community's noncoop-
eration with law enforcement, for reasons of linked fate and the law's
diminished legitimacy, similarly. Through noncooperation with po-
lice, community members may reduce their total losses. They gain
more by nonenforcement, which occurs when they do not help police,
because it reduces their social costs of punishment, than they lose by
not helping police punish offenders, which raises the costs of crime.
This does not mean, however, that community members are sanguine
about wrongdoing in their communities. They likely would prefer a
prevention strategy with more legitimacy and fewer social costs that
reduces the incidence of wrongdoing: something, perhaps, on the
model of less punitive, compliance-oriented strategies that regulate
corporate activity.
The choice to prosecute culpable wrongdoing, then, turns in large
part on two consequentialist concerns-whether civil sanctions exist
that serve deterrence aims well and whether the social costs of pun-
ishment register politically and can be lessened by use of civil reme-
dies. Enforcement officials weigh utilitarian concerns against retribu-
tivist ones in decisions to pursue or even devise enforcement options.
But there is another aspect of this dynamic. Street offenders face
criminal sanctions more often, and thereby are characterized not
merely as wrongdoers but blameworthy actors, because of the paucity
of civil means to address street wrongdoing. The choice of enforce-
ment options helps shape views of conduct as more or less culpable.
Culpability itself is not simply a stable factor weighed against utilitar-
ian concerns, but an assessment dynamically constructed by punish-
ment practice and the culture of which it is a part.
C. The Meaning of Enforcement and Punishment Strategies
What does it mean that willful conduct prohibited by felony
criminal statutes, which causes substantial harm and for which the
government has no evidentiary problems, is nonetheless pursued by
the government solely as a civil action or resolved in a civil settlement?
Much white-collar wrongdoing is conduct that the government has an
affirmative, justified reason to punish criminally. Prosecutorial decli-
156 Id.
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nation is a species of lawmaking with expressive effects.17 Yet because
discretion is used differently in white-collar and street settings, it has
different expressive effects, different meanings, in each context for
the public, the offender class, and even enforcement officials.
Widespread handling of conduct as civil when it is eligible for
criminal prosecution negates the public view of the conduct as crimi-
nally culpable. As a consequence of the law's educative function, the
public gets the signal that such civilly sanctioned wrongdoing is not as
blameworthy as real crime that must be dealt with criminally. Willful
white-collar wrongdoing comes to seem less criminal, while street
wrongdoing, always prosecuted criminally, comes to seem more so.
Offenders do not acknowledge the moral culpability of their actions,
and they develop expectations that certain conduct will not be treated
criminally even though it is covered by a criminal statute. Hence, de-
fense attorneys regularly argue to prosecutors that their clients should
not be indicted because their conduct was not really a crime, and
prosecutors sometimes agree.'5" Civil liability signals blameworthiness
only in a limited civil law sense that one must accept responsibility for
harn caused. Civil sanctions can be extensive and punitive, but they
lack the expressiveness of criminal culpability.
In this way, our practices ofjudgment and punishment communi-
cate and help actively construct the meaning of the conduct and
harms they address. David Garland's description of how traditional
criminal punishments work as cultural agents explains our regulatory
responses to corporate wrongdoing. Sanction practices, Garland
writes,
are one part of an authoritative, institutional discourse which seeks to
organize our moral and political understanding and to educate our sen-
timents and sensibilities.... Through their judgments, condemnations
and classifications they teach us (and persuade us) how to judge, what to
condemn, and how to classifT .... [T]he practices, institutions and dis-
courses of penalty all signi, and the meanings which are conveyed
thereby tend to outrun the immediacies of crime and punishment and
F,7 S e Stuntz, s/pra note 137, at 28 (explaining that the prosecutor is "a lawmaker,
not a law taker"). It is widely accepted, for instance, that adultery will not be prose-
cuted and thus is not perceived as a crime, even though many states still have statutes
criminalizing it. See id. at 34-35 (comparing sodomy laws and marijuana possession as
criminal prohibitions that "forbid behavior that is not treated as criminal, even by po-
lice and prosecutors," with some traffic offenses that are widely enforced because they
are "functionally civil").
] , LN. supra note 141, at 192-200; Lynch, supra note 2, at 23-26.
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'speak of broader and more extended issues.159
Enforcement strategies and punishment practices likewise con-
struct and regulate our understanding of street crime and the re-
sponses that seem compelled by it. Used much more extensively for
street wrongdoing, criminal punishment reinforces the view that such
conduct is so blameworthy that only criminal sanction is appropriate.
These cultural, educative influences affect perceptions of both the
public and enforcement officials so that punitive strategies become
the default response to street crime, while civil remedies dominate
corporate crime. '60 The distinctive practices become self-reinforcing.
The meanings of enforcement practices affect not only negotiations
between prosecutors and defense attorneys about charging, as noted
above, but also shape public debate. 16' They make many of us more
receptive to arguments that dispute the appropriateness of criminal
punishment even for very harmful wrongdoing in corporate settings,
and of less punitive alternatives in street contexts.
A prime example comes from the public debate regarding the sav-
ings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. In an argument that one cannot
imagine gaining an equivalent level of prominence about street crime,
"the failure of the regulatory system [was] widely seen as a principal
cause of large-scale criminal conduct."'612 One top regulator said, "'I
suppose bad members of the industry are at fault, but they are at fault
because the government allowed them in. The government said
here's the candy .... and then call[ed] off supervision... [to] create
almost an entrapment-a fatal attraction .... Zimring and Haw-
kins noted that "many observers ... speak of regulatory changes as a
proximate cause of a wave of financial recklessness quite frequently
including criminal conduct.... [and] that this was one crime wave
that was made in Washington."'"'
In addition, public explanations for the savings and loan debacle
are a good example of how a tradition of civil regulatory enforcement,
rather than punitive criminal enforcement, shapes understandings of
wrongdoing that support those divergent strategies. Civil regimes with
little morally expressive content foster understandings of wrongdoing
,) GARLAND, supra note 109, at 252-53.
160 Id. at 262.
161 See supra text accompanying note 158.
162 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 281 (emphasis added).
(163 Id. at 282 (quoting William Seidman, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Chairman) (citation omitted).
164 Id.
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in structural terms-in terms of being influenced and partly explained
by a poorly administered social or regulatory environment. The
moral judgment implicit in criminal law, in contrast, necessarily im-
plies individual moral failing that suppresses social context explana-
tions. By characterizing the causes of wrongdoing differently, we re-
vise assessments about the degree of blameworthiness of particular
conduct, just as by choosing one deterrence mechanism-civil sanc-
tion-over another-criminal sanction-affects views about how
much retribution offenders deserve.
In contrast, consider the widely publicized strategy by prosecutors
in at least two dozen states in the 1990s of prosecuting mothers of ba-
bies exposed to cocaine in utero.'6 While the policy had its oppo-
nents, led by the American Civil Liberties Union and scholars such as
Dorothy Roberts, enforcement officials stressed the need for the "very
firm stick" of criminal prosecution to coerce drug treatment, includ-
ing a no-drop prosecution policy for second drug test failures. Judges
sentenced some women to several years in prison. Structural influ-
ences, or even the mother's drug addiction, played no mediating role
in descriptions of this public health problem, even though this aspect
of street crime-drug use-is one for which we have at least small-
scale models for successful, civil remedies. 6
One implication of these examples is how the practice of en-
forcement affects views about the degree to which particular conduct
is culpable. That is, what distinguishes white-collar from street en-
forcement is not only that we take different account of social costs in
each sector, but also how we balance those costs with deterrence goals
and the need to label culpability. We support the shift of civil alterna-
tives by reducing the culpability assessment of the wrongdoing itself so
that it weighs less heavily in that overall assessment. Ranking different
offenses on a moral scale of blameworthiness is inevitably imprecise
mad contentious," ' but enforcement practices help make some con-
duct just seem so bad, while other actions seem, almost viscerally,
J,' Roberts, supra note 82, at 938. For a highly critical analysis of these prosecu-
tions, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts IWho Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equalit , and the Right of Privay, 104 HLARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). But see KENNEDY, supra
note 25, at 353-63 (criticizing Roberts's analysis).
1, Roberts, supra note 82, at 94145.
I &e infra Part V.B (discussing drug treatment courts). The public was receptive
enough to this approach to elect the local prosecutor who campaigned on this strategy
as the state's attorney general. Roberts, supra note 82, at 945.
0., &SeStuntz, supra note 137, at 30 (arguing that there is "no good metric" for de-
ciding "what offenses do and don't deserve criminal status").
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much more so.10 Acknowledging environmental influences frames
conduct in a manner that makes it easier to view the conduct as de-
serving less blame. Being part of a larger regulatory environment
makes it easier to see white-collar crime as a product of structural in-
fluences rather than as merely bad actors whose moral failings alone
explain crime.'70 Here we can see how the earlier description of cor-
porate liability, with its implicit acknowledgment of social context as a
cause of corporate crime, is in accord with this analysis.
D. The Implications of Structural Thinking and
the Contingency of Culpability
Recognizing structural pressures on conduct sharply changes en-
forcement strategies. It prompts legal responses to wrongdoing that
reduce the opportunity for crime; we change the actor's context to
make crime less possible. Thus, for corporate wrongdoing, we see an
array of remedies imposed for past wrongdoing that are essentially
structural changes with preventive goals. Offenders, or merely anyone
engaged in a given activity, may have to report their conduct, be it en-
vironmental discharge of waste or financial transactions."' Or, of-
fenders may have to agree to business structures that prevent future
collusion. These sorts of legal responses, common in regulatory law
and arising from deterrence frameworks, focus little on blame and
much on reducing opportunities for recurrence of wrongdoing.
Criminal law's responses to street crime, on the other hand, do
not emphasize restructuring a criminogenic setting, in large part be-
cause those changes are not in control of an individual offender or
law enforcement officials, for the most part. Those responses are
mostly characterized by punitive sanctions with retributive goals-fo-
cused on the individual wrongdoer who chose poorly in his conduct,
rather than on conditions that encourage such choices. Even the
progressive rationale for criminal sanctions, far from dominant today,
aims for rehabilitation of the individual, rather than targeting the op-
1' See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997) (broadly describing
the social construction of emotions, including responses of disgust); Dan M. Kahan,
The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1621 (1998) (suggest-
ing the utility of Miller's thesis in criminal law).
See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 286-88 (discussing the triumph of
structural explanations of theories of crime causation).
1 For examples in environmental, occupational safety, and futures markets con-
texts, see Neil Gunningham, Beyond Command and Controk Towards Flexible and CWs-
Effective Business Regulation, in BUSINESs, ETHIcs AND THE LAw 93, 95-109 (CAJ. Coady
& G.J.G. Sampford eds., 1993).
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portunities and influences for crime that surround him.
These distinctions between how we treat street and corporate
wrongdoers are not driven by objective, inalterable differences in of-
fenders and offenses, but by whether we emphasize moral autonomy
or social influence in our view of the offender and her conduct. This
choice informs our relative preferences for punitive or regulatory ap-
proaches to wrongdoing. As the arguments over the savings and loan
crisis and drug crime policy show, we could just as easily describe drug
offenders as products of criminogenic communities that call for struc-
tural, public health responses rather than punitive, criminal ones,
while we view illegal savings and loan operators causing billions of dol-
lars in harm as immoral actors for whom the primary response should
be criminal punishment. Criminal law focuses us on an offender's
character, while regulatory justice focuses us on the social harm that
needs a remedy. Regulatory policy toward corporate wrongdoing
helps sustain the premise that there is little wrong with corporate of-
lenders' character. Context and influences they face lead some peo-
ple of ordinary character to socially harmful conduct. Yet the absence
of civil, regulatory, or other less punitive strategies is not compelled by
street offenders' poverty nor by other structural barriers. We have
failed to develop structurally oriented, less punitive approaches be-
cause enforcement practices limit our perceived range of options.
The use of punitive criminal law to combat street crime builds and
perpetuates ideological frameworks that support punitive approaches
and take regulatory alternatives off the table.
There is no better example of this ideological tunnel vision than
our response to the 900-pound gorilla of contemporary criminal
dockets-drug cases."2 Analysts widely agree that drug crime, and the
property and violent crime associated with it, can be more effectively
and cheaply addressed with a public health strategy of treatment and
prevention, backed up only secondarily by criminal sanctions with
lower social costs, rather than through the current approach of puni-
tive criminal enforcement as a default solution. 17 We have segmented
SoK 1' Cnie &Justice Facts, supra note 77, at 2 ("Of cases concluded in Federal
district court in ever), year since 1989, there have been more drug cases than other
t4pus of cases.").
0 A review of U.S. drug policy over the past decades finds a strategy character-
ized by an overriding focus on criminal sanctions .... We have refused to rec-
ognize any, limits in criminal law by continuing to push for greater and harsher
penalties in the mistaken belief that citizens can be frightened or shocked into
giving up their insatiable drug habit.
Gregory H. Williams & Sara C. Williams, America's Drug Policy: 117o Are the Addicts?, 75
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drug enforcement efforts to focus on a portion of drug users and sell-
ers who are disproportionately minority and poor,7 4 which feeds an
image of drug criminals that further entrenches public preference for
punitive approaches over civil and remedial utilitarian ones. Using
criminal law to address even illicit drug use by addicts demonstrates
how compelling the expressive need for criminal punishment seems as
a result of its long practice. The behavior arising from addiction
should be at least as easy to characterize with minimal emphasis on
moral failure as savings and loan crimes. Thus, culpability is not an
absolute value. Assessments of criminal blameworthiness are partly a
function of the alternatives to criminal blaming. Culpability is a de-
pendent variable.
Synonymous with savings and loans crimes or crack use during
pregnancy, domestic violence is a good example of the social con-
struction of moral culpability. Until recently, a classic battery commit-
ted by a spouse simply was not viewed as a crime. This same construc-
tion of what counts as crime extends throughout all harmful
wrongdoing: crime is not crime due to any objective sine qua non such
as harm, intent, or even, surreptitiously, the identity of the actor.
Those factors do play a part, but larger contexts of culture and per-
spective arising from particular social practices greatly affect how we
interpret those factors. This complex dynamic determines culpability.
Then, as we have seen, culpability is merely one element that is
weighed against consequentialist concerns in decisions whether to
treat wrongdoing criminally.
The variability in whether we view wrongdoing as requiring crimi-
nal condemnation mimics our practice at the adjudication stage in le-
gal interpretation. Mark Kelman has noted that applying statutes re-
quires the implicit construction of a fact pattern, "characterized by
interpretive constructs," that operates without conscious acknowl-
edgment.' 75 These interpretive choices have the effect of making "a
IOWA L. REV. 1119, 1130 (1990); see also, e.g., STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS, at xviii
(1993) (coming to the conclusion "that the costs [of the drug war] are not remotely
justified"); MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 12-13 (1998) (proposing a new public health
approach to the nation's drug problem); Michael Winerip, Why Harlem Drug Cops Don't
Discuss Race, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 2000, at Al (reporting that a police lieutenant who su-
pervises a "buy-and-bust" drug enforcement team said, "[i]n my humble opinion, we're
doing nothing up here").
See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 1804-13 (describing differences in investigative ef-
forts in upscale versus downscale drug markets resulting from the fact that downscale
markets are much cheaper to investigate).
175 Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
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single legal result seem[] inevitable. ",17' Kelman argues that interpre-
tive constructs in criminal law operate in several ways to unconsciously
shape our view of a defendant's conduct.17   For example, we can
choose to broadly or narrowly construct the relevant time frame.'"
Sometimes events that occur before or after the offender's key con-
duct become relevant to judging an act as criminal. Similarly, we view
a defendant's intent narrowly, looking solely to the physical actions at
the moment of the alleged crime, or broadly, to include her goals and
motives." ' Additionally, criminal law alternates between assessing an
offender distinctly, as a particular individual with specific perceptions
and capabilities, or more generically, as a person of normal capacities
who fits widely held assumptions about human traits and abilities.""
Implicit in these choices of interpretive constructs are normative base-
lines defining which facts are relevant to understanding offenders'
conduct and assessing culpability.
What Kelman has identified in statutory interpretation also oper-
ates throughout enforcement policy. In viewing crime in corporate
settings more structurally, we frame such conduct in a manner that
makes it easier to accept civil remedies over criminal sanctions, to
lessen individual liability in exchange for corporate liability, and to
ease corporate liability in exchange for promises of preventive struc-
tural reform, such as compliance plans. The relatively deterrence-
focused mode for corporate crime, in contrast, restrains movement
toward a dysfunctionally harsh corporate criminal policy that would
match, say, the war on drugs. In contrast, we repress social and struc-
tural influences with street offenders and cabin our perspective in a
way that facilitates punitive criminal tactics. The relatively expressive
mode in which street crime law is understood represses the prospect
of moving to alternative sanctions or noncriminal regulatory and pol-
icy approaches."1
REV. 591, 593 (1981).
17'. Id.
177 Id.
17 Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 595-96, 620-33; see also Lynch, supra note 2, at 42 (making a comparable
point about unacknowledged narrow or broad framing of offenders' actions to make
conduct seem more or less undesirable).
"" Kelman, supra note 175, at 596, 633-42.
Note that federal criminal statutes have expanded in recent years to cover con-
duct also governed, and previously only governed, by civil law. We have had a modest
but notable increase in the use of criminal law as a tool to deal with white-collar
wrongdoing. One might offer lots of reasons for that shift-from the political ease
with which Congress now enacts tougher criminal statutes, to a gradual elimination of
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E. Political Process Problems and Offenders' Influence
Enforcement policy is set by political actors-executive branch of-
ficials and agencies-and the implicit choices creating the divergent
paths of white-collar and street criminal liability are ultimately politi-
cal ones. It is worth noting how this political outcome occurs when
constitutional law makes a substantial effort to govern political bias
against a classic discrete and insular minority, criminal defendants,
who are likely to lose out in majoritarian political processes. We con-
stitutionalized much of criminal procedure as a protection against po-
litical bias aimed at such out-groups. s2 Criminal defendants seem to
be an obvious out-group, not only because we expect the majority to
have little sympathy toward criminal conduct, but because we usually
think of offenders as being mostly poor and black. Yet it turns out
that there are criminal defendants and there are criminal defendants.
For traditional street offenders, who are disproportionately poor and
minority, this political process analysis holds. For white-collar offend-
ers, however, it does not. Moreover, as William Stuntz has shown in a
series of articles, constitutional criminal procedure is not much of a pro-
tection against political bias without also constitutionalizing substan-
tive criminal law. 83 Legislators and police can avoid procedural re-
a former class bias, to the widening rich-poor income gap and growth of corporate en-
tities-all of which may be fueling a modest anticorporate/populist backlash. The
analysis here, however, suggests another possibility: growing criminalization is a by-
product of our shift in the last thirty years to a more retributive and punitive criminal
justice system for street crimes and of the increasing use of criminal law over other so-
cial policy tools to address social problems. Drug use is the perfect example of such a
problem. Drug use is a social problem that clearly could be dealt with effectively with a
regulatory and public health approach-and briefly, three decades ago, was-but it
has been demonized instead as morally condemnable criminal activity. See MDSSING,
supra note 173 (documenting public health approaches to drug addiction from the
Nixon administration to the present day). Criminal law overall has become such an
expression-loaded tool that the existence of criminal statutes governing white-collar
activity must mean that such conduct deserves a harsh approach as well.
Although white-collar crime has followed street crime trends in the sense that
there are some indicators of increased use of criminal law, and longer sentences, for
corporate wrongdoing in the past two decades, the more important but less noticed
comparison is the divergence in approaches to wrongdoing in these two sectors. The
last three decades have seen a marked transition in thinking about regulation of firms
and white-collar activity that emphasizes cooperation and deemphasizes punitieness.
In the street crime context, meanwhile, we have seen a steadily increasing move toward
punitiveness and an ever-decreasing reliance on cooperative and compliance fostering
strategies.
M2 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000) (describing the Supreme Court's early constitutional criminal
procedure decisions as an effort to protect blacks facingJim Crowjustice).
183 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
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strictions by expanding substantive liability, giving police and prosecu-
tors more discretion to investigate, charge, and bargain. For street of-
fenders, this strategy has subverted the goals of constitutionalized
criminal procedure. White-collar offenders, however, have had more
success responding to the expansive substantive criminal law that they
face." They have expansive civil and regulatory liability on their side.
Furthermore, the majority of white-collar offenders are neither poor
nor black. They are wealthy enough to have a political voice in the
lawmaking and enforcement mechanism that governs them and to
make the increased costs that criminal procedure impose on the gov-
ernment compared to civil procedure a significant factor. The upshot
is a variation on the political process problem for criminal defendants:
power and wealth help to get one's wrongdoing treated civilly, while
political marginality means wrongdoing will likely be treated crimi-
nally."'
Debra Livingston, Dan Kahan, and Tracey Meares have all argued
that courts should relax constitutional governance of police enforce-
ment when the communities being policed have a sufficient voice in
the local political system and are able to influence substantially the
discretionary enforcement choices by police."' This relative increase
CriminalJnstire, 107 YALE LJ. 1, 6 (1997) ("Constitutionalizing procedure, in a world
where substantive law and funding are the province of legislatures, may tend to en-
courage bad substantive law and underfunding. But constitutionalizing some aspects
of substantive criminal law and defense funding would not tend to encourage bad pro-
cedure, or bad anything else.").
I-; See, r.g., Yeager, supra note 40, at 119, 136 (discussing large finns' ability to ne-
gotiate substantive pollution standards to which they will be held by regulators).
1" Here my loose usage of the terms "white-collar" and "corporate" crime needs to
be more precise. This claim about political voice is broadly true for corporate offend-
ers. See, e.g., Peter C. Yeager, Law, Crime, and Inequality: The Regulatoiy State, in CRIME
AND INEQALITY 247 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (describing industry
negotiation with regulators over what environmental standards must be met to be in
compliance). Depending on one's definition of white-collar crime, however, it is less
true. Some studies suggest that most offenders of crimes that can be labeled "white-
collar" are in tact nonwealthy, middle class people. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL.,
CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLSSES (1991). Throughout this Article, I have tried to em-
phasize a subset of white-collar offenses, such as environmental, health care fraud, and
financial fraud crimes, for which my thesis is most salient. I acknowledge, however,
that many crimes that can plausibly be labeled "white-collar," such as false-statement
crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1005, and 1014, can be and are committed by non-
wealthy individuals.
Se Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis in Criminal Procedure, 86
GEo. LJ. 1153, 1173 (1998) ("The political process theory tells courts not only when
they, should relax the standard of review, but also when they shouldn't."); Debra Living-
ston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the
New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 660-61 (1997) ("By openly discussing the formu-
lation of guidelines, police effectively announce in advance the approach to a problem
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in the local power of minority communities, a power that did not exist
before the victories of the civil rights movement thirty-five years ago, is
one example of how political power can regulate and inform criminal
justice policy. That level of influence on some segments ofjustice pol-
icy-city ordinances and enforcement strategies-however, is only one
piece of the larger criminal justice system, which in turn operates
within a larger political dynamic. Local influence is not yet matched
at other levels of political debate about criminal justice policy and its
alternatives. While there is evidence that neighborhoods have enough
political power to make police responsive to their desires, concern
about, 8 and evidence of,' minority community distrust of police
continues. This distrust stems from practices on other fronts, which
range from racial profiling to draconian incarceration policies.
Meares, for example, writes in support of broad ordinances checked
by local influence on police and yet also about the loss of legitimacy
that the criminal justice system faces in black communities due to
punishment policies.'" Street crime offenders and the communities
in which they live have much less influence in shaping policy and en-
forcement choices than white-collar offenders and corporations.
Street offenders are disadvantaged in the political process, which
permits enforcement officials to externalize the social costs of punitive
enforcement policies. White-collar offenders, however, are much
more effective at bringing those costs to the forefront of political de-
bate and using them as an argument for enforcement alternatives."'"
that the department has tentatively decided to take. Police can obtain information
from neighborhood residents or from advisory councils and the larger community
about the acceptability of the planned approach.").
187 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 186, at 1167 (discussing how the citizens of Af-
rican-American communities, for example, have been using their political power to
obtain more effective law enforcement in the inner cities); Livingston, supra note 186,
at 654 ("This responsiveness and accountability to the community is particularly im-
portant in the context of police interventions aimed at restoring or preserving the
quality of life in local neighborhoods.").
es See COLE, supra note 25, at 5 (noting that poor and minority citizens are dispro-
portionately victimized by crime); KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 157 (discussing racial
profiling); Fagan & Meares, supra note 27, at Part I ("The growth in incarcera-
tion ... has been far greater for African-Americans than any other ethnic or racial
group,-").
See Rosen, supra note 26, at 54 (discussing whether white and black jurors are
capable of transracial agreement).
90 Meares, supra note 92, at 678; Fagen & Meares, supra note 27.
:91 See, e.g.,Jost & Davies, supra note 29, at 242-46 (describing the political backlash
following a punitive approach to Medicare and Medicaid fraud); Yeager, supra note
185, at 250 ("Potential white-collar or business defendants are commonly involved in
the active shaping of the very legal definitions being applied to their behaviors by en-
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V. How STREET CRIME POLICY COULD BE MORE LIKE
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME POLICY
The implication of this analysis is that criminal and regulatory pol-
icy in both street and white-collar settings depends a lot more on
things that we can change-descriptive interpretations of wrongdoing,
recognition of social influences, the priority of retributivist or conse-
quentialist goals, and development of a broad array of enforcement
options-than on things we cannot-offenders' wealth, legal recogni-
tion of firms but not gangs or neighborhoods, or hard distinctions in
types of offenders. Thus, street crime enforcement could take strides
toward preventive, compliance-oriented, less punitive, regulatory
strategies that we have devised for white-collar wrongdoing. It could
take advantage of, rather than ignore and contradict, knowledge
about social influence; it could more fully assess and minimize the so-
cial costs of punishment. Street crime policy could follow corporate
regulatory policy by making criminal law an ancillary tool for preven-
tion. This would be one means among several for confronting the
most culpable wrongdoing, while a mix of less punitive strategies
dominates policy.
In fact, we already have several models for some of the compo-
nents of such a strategy. Most are small-scale, but nonetheless have
sufficient track records of success to point the way toward reshaping
street crime policies of enforcement and punishment. Even if all of
these models were more widely implemented, there would still only be
a very partial shift toward the corporate crime/regulatory model. Re-
tributivism and command-and-control deterrence have dominated
policy thinking on street crime for so long, without influence from the
progress in corporate crime regulation, that these examples merely
suggest the direction in which policy could move rather than map its
details. Nonetheless, consider the following as sketches toward how
such a regime could, in part, look.
A. Community Policing
The best known component of a transformed street crime policy is
a subset of the strategies that compose community policing, which
have garnered a lot of scholarly and political attention in recent years.
A variety of approaches going by the label of community policing have
been instituted in many American cities over the last fifteen years, in-
forcement officials.").
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cluding most of the largest.) 2 One approach, sometimes called order-
maintenance or problem-oriented policing,19 can take many forms,
and its variation in part accounts for its mixed track record."4 Com-
munity policing is closely associated with the "broken windows" theory
that urges police to focus on relatively minor "quality of life" problems
that are associated with neighborhood disorder and foreshadow larger
crime problems-these include loitering, aggressive panhandling,
graffiti, and unsafe parks or vacant properties.'5 The theory argues
that by restoring order and a feeling of security among residents, po-
lice help reinforce informal social norms and influences that reduce
serious crime." 6 Yet, like criminal justice policy generally, community
policing policies vary from aggressively punitive to cooperative ap-
proaches that emphasize local cooperation and prevention over zeal-
ous criminal enforcement.
Some versions of community policing, such as New York City's,
take a more punitive form of aggressive misdemeanor arrest policies
to enforce "zero tolerance" for conduct that contributes to social dis-
order.'97 This approach reduces disorder; however, it can have heavy
192 See THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed.,
1994); TODD MCEWEN, NAT'L INST. OF JuSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM:
1994 SURVEY RESULTS 27 (1995) (finding that eighty-two percent of police chiefs
polled have adopted some community policing strategies, and the remainder indicated
a desire to adopt such strategies); WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT,
COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 5 (1997) (evaluating community policing ef-
forts in Chicago); Jonathan Eig, Eyes on the Street: Community Policing in Chicago, AM.
PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 60, 61 ("[C]ommunity policing is ubiquitous.").
193 See Livingston, supra note 186, at 558-59, 573, 575 (defining order-maintenance
policing as helping to refocus attention on problems of neighborhood disorder).
194 Eig, supra note 192, at 64-66 (describing scholarly assessments that "community
policing failed in New York [City]," but seems more successful elsewhere, including
Chicago, Portland, and San Diego, due to long-term political leadership, "commit-
ments of funds[,] and institutional change" within police departments).
195 SeeJames Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29 (articulating the "broken windows" theory); see alsoJames Q. Wilson &
George L. Kelling, Alaking Neighborhoods Safe; ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1989, at 46, 48
[hereinafter Wilson & Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe) ("If the first broken window
in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that
no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken.").
196 See Kahan, supra note 11, at 367-77 (discussing order maintenance as a law en-
forcement strategy); Livingston, supra note 186, at 573-91 (discussing the positive ef-
fects of community policing on neighborhood safety).
197 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291 (1998) (criticizing New York's version of community
policing as overly aggressive and punitive); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at 24-27 (describing the shift in New York's community polic-
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legitimacy costs. The strategies that more effectively move street pol-
icy to a regulatory model aim to involve officers in ongoing coopera-
tive alliances with local citizens to engage in proactive activities to re-
duce crime by improving neighborhood order and quality of life.
For example, police in Newport News, Virginia, helped to substan-
tially reduce burglaries in a troubled housing project by working with
other city agencies to improve the deteriorating physical condition of
the properties and ensure trash removal.9' The programs followed in
Boston and Chicago also exemplify this cooperative, nonpunitive ap-
proach.""' The "Boston strategy" is built on a broad alliance between
police, social service agencies, and leaders of churches, schools, and
community groups.2 After-school programs for youth are a key part
of antigang efforts, as are joint police-church leader alliances that tar-
get youth identified, through police discussions with community
members, as at-risk for joining gangs. In this program, ministers and
police jointly visit schools and even homes to dissuade youth from
gang activity by warning them of the strict enforcement of criminal
sanctions for gang-related crimes and encouraging them to participate
in more productive activities.2 ' Similarly, in Chicago, individual offi-
cers develop friendly relationships with community members that can
ing strategy to a punitive "zero tolerance" policy that hurt police relations with minor-
ity communities).I~ Se Livingston, supra note 186, at 575 (illustrating how community policing
helped the burglary rate drop by thirty-five percent); Wilson & Kelling, Making Neigh-
bjiwods Safi, 5upra note 195, at 46-47 (same).1", On Boston's program, see Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Rethinking the Culture of
Professional Policing: Democratic Theory, Police Integrity and a Service-Oriented
Communit, Justice Model of Law Enforcement 11-13 (Sept. 23, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file %ith author). On Chicago's program, see SKOGAN & HARTNETT,
%lpra note 192; Eig, supra note 192, at 63 ("Chicago's community policing program
may be the city's most progressive police reform in years.").
So, First Safety, Then Civility, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, at 25 [hereinafter First
Saft,(] ("What makes Boston's crime-fighting different is the willingness of the police
to work %ith other organisations and community groups."); Charles A. Radin, Youth
Crime Down, but Not Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1999, at BI (describing the "Boston
Strategy" as a "one-two punch involving community groups and law enforcement
aimed at getting troublesome youths off the street"); Charles A. Radin & Daniel
Vasquez, Citv Mobilizes To Stem Gangs' Lure, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1998, at Al (dis-
cussing Boston's antigang and community policing efforts).
&"Q S'e Radin, supra note 200 (noting that police officers supported the initiative
because they believed "enforcement alone [would] not solve the city's youth problems
or prevent a resurgence in crime"); Radin & Vasquez, supra note 200 (explaining that
"police developed a list of more than 200 at-risk youths" and "teams of ministers and
law-enforcement officers began visiting their homes"). Note that this strategy follows
Ayres and Braithaite's model of "benign big guns" for regulators who put persuasion
and cooperation in the foreground but keep the backup of punishment clear to of-
fenderns. AvRES & BRAITHWMAITE, supra note 34, at 49.
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lead to acquiring better information helpful in catching offenders, as-
suring that witnesses show up to court, and assisting police work with
neighborhoods on "pressing community issues such as abandoned ve-
hicles and neglected children."212 For example, one Chicago beat of-
ficer using the approach reports that she rarely writes traffic tickets.
2
113
Due to her knowledge and trust in the community, she arranged for a
parole violator that she spotted on the street to be picked up the next
day rather than taken to jail immediately.2° The officer believes that
that level of respect and cooperation accounts not only for why the of-
fender cooperated instead of fleeing, but why gang members on an-
other occasion helped subdue a man who was resisting arrest by
punching the officer. 5
These sorts of strategies exactly parallel the nonpunitive, coopera-
tive, negotiated compliance strategies found increasingly in white-
collar regulation. In both settings, the biggest challenge can be
changing the mindset of enforcement officials, agency inspectors, or
police officers from punitive sanctioning to cooperative and preven-
tive problem solving that builds trust and mutual respect. Officers'
roles in community policing roughly match the role of "Designated
Compliance Officers" in OSHA's Cooperative Compliance Program,
who were freed from the usual pressures on inspectors to "write cita-
tions and build a case." °7 Compliance officers instead built coopera-
tive and advisory relationships with regulated firms as part of OSHA's
shift to "flexible regulatory enforcement" and away from its traditional
approach of frequent citations and fines.2 08 Likewise, these policing
strategies recall the EPA's negotiation with firms that violate pollution
rules for "supplemental environmental projects" in lieu of sanctions."'
202 Eig, supra note 192, at 62.
203 Id. at 63.
204 Id. at 62-63.
205 Id.
206 See id. at 67 ("[T]he ultimate success of community policing still depends on the
outcome of a fight for the hearts and minds of police officers.").
2 REES, supra note 33, at 195; see also id. at 175-218 (describing the Cooperative
ComNliance Program and Compliance Officers' roles).
2 See id. at 194-95 (discussing OSHA's attempt to match "regulatory tools" to
"regulatory problems").
209 For the EPA's policy, see EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 63
Fed. Reg. 24,796 (May 5, 1998). In all of these contexts, there is a risk of "capture" of
regulators by the firms or people they regulate. Police forces risk greater incidence of
corruption with officers established in communities. The risk of agency co-optation by
firms is well known. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 54-57, 74 (dis-
cussing capture in agency contexts generally); REES, supra note 33, at 236 (noting the
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In addition to these explicitly cooperative, nonpunitive compo-
nents, community policing sometimes includes harsher strategies, two
of the most prominent being antigang loitering ordinances and civil
injunctions that declare gang activity a public nuisance. Both are
widely used now in several cities, although the most prominent loiter-
210ing ordinance-Chicago's-was recently declared unconstitutional.
Both of these strategies are more punitive than cooperative. The loi-
tering strategy, and related approaches using juvenile curfews or tradi-
tional loitering ordinances, convicts offenders of a low-grade crime.
The injunction strategy is more innovative. It declares a particular
street gang a public nuisance and enjoins its members from a range of
activities, some of which are otherwise legal conduct.
These strategies likewise shift street enforcement a few degrees
toward the regulatory enforcement model. Loitering prosecutions are
aggressive and, to many offenders, may seem harassing and nit-
picking. Because police clearly target their efforts on certain sub-
groups who are mostly young and minorities, the approach risks ag-
gravating previously existing legitimacy problems. Yet, there is some
evidence that the strategy is not widely viewed this way in the commu-
nities in which it is employed.' Scholars who advocate the approach
and work with or survey community groups where the loitering ordi-
nance has been enforced find broad support for the strategy, even
though people there are likely to oppose much harsher enforcement
212strategies that rely on long prison terms.
These sentiments accord with policy arguments for the strategy
that track corporate regulatory approaches more than punitive street
crime models. Loitering enforcement is part of a larger order-
maintenance policing regime that supports a social norms strategy for
crime prevention. By removing loiterers who signal a strong gang
presence in a community, the community reduces the fear and in-
timidation experienced by residents-social costs of crime borne by
possible dangers of co-optation for OSHA inspectors); Dana, supra note 44, at 1212-14
(providing evidence of underdeterrence supplemental environmental agreements,
which may reflect similar problems in the EPA's regulatory scheme).
21' City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
211 See First Safety, supra note 200 (discussing reduced hostility to a police stop-and-
frisk policy achieved because "'[a] lot of the problem [of hostility] goes [away] if there
is mutual respect, if the police explain why the search is being done'" (quoting Boston
Police Commissioner Paul Evans)).
212 Se; e.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 186, at 1163 ("Broadly speaking, inner-city
minorities support the new community policing .... ."); see also Stuntz, supra note 24, at
1797 (noting that survey data of African-American citizens find opposition to "get
tough" enforcement policies and a general lack of faith in the criminal justice system).
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indirect victims-and modestly signals that law-abidingness, rather
than criminal activity, characterizes the community. Further, despite
being punitive, loitering convictions are much less punitive than con-
victions for more serious crimes. The approach not only reduces the
ancillary social costs of criminal enforcement, especially those stem-
ming from long incarceration, but it also mimics Braithwaite's respon-
sive-regulation pyramid model of punishment that urges the least pu-
nitive sanctions be applied first-that is, loitering arrests rather than
drug arrests.
213
The public nuisance injunctions, used prominently in California,
214are justified in the same way. Despite their civil form, they are un-
deniably burdensome and punitive on offenders. They substantially
infringe liberty interests and raise constitutional questions.2 7' They
are, however, at least less punitive than criminal convictions and incar-
ceration would be, and their stigmatic and expressive effects, while
not negligible, are also less than criminal sanctions would be. Public
nuisance injunctions bear comparison to the severe civil remedies that
firms face under regulatory regimes. Civil investigative demands, ad-
ministrative and civil fines, recordkeeping requirements, and injunc-
tive conditions are substantial burdens and sanctions, even though
they are not criminal in form. Industries sometimes complain about
such regulation, but offender complaints about those tools probably
are not the key source of legitimacy problems for enforcement re-
gimes. Like the gang loiterers who resent ordinance enforcement, of-
fending firms are still encountering the lesser of two harsh responses.
Better to incur harsh civil sanctions than harsh criminal ones.
Unlike a social depravity defense, the best community policing
strategies provide a feasible way to incorporate knowledge of social
norms and influence into criminal justice policy. Rather than ignor-
ing the bad "constitutive luck" of some classes of offenders, commu-
nity policing, in part, takes rough account of it, shifting some of its re-
sources from harsh punitivism toward strategies that work to revise the
social influence generating some of that bad luck, and thus strength-
213 See AYREs & BRAiTHwArrE, supra note 34, at 35 (laying out the fundamentals of
pyramid strategies of responsive regulation);John Braithwaite, InequalitY and Republican
Criminology, in CRIME AND INEQUALiTy 277, 299-302 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson
eds., 1995) (diagramming sanctioning possibilities through which the state can esca-
late).
214 See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (upholding the
use of civil public nuisance injunctions against gang members in SanJose, California).
215 Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nui-
sance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1999).
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ening prevention and enforcement. In this way, community policing
is a type of street criminal justice policy where program directors can
put into action a social influence conception in a roughly comparable
way to its role in the corporate context. When possible, officials con-
sciously avoid tactics that alienate citizens and engender resistance.
Criminal justice policies that reduce social disorder bear some com-
parison to corporate compliance plans that use social influence and
surveillance to reduce criminal acts, while moderating the use of puni-
tive sanctions.
B. Drug Treatment Courts
Another reform of traditional approaches to street crime is the re-
cent, widespread development of drug courts."' Alongside, and in
partial response to, draconian mandatory sentencing rules for drug
offenders, state and federal jurisdictions have designed a less punitive,
treatment-oriented alternative to imprisonment. Drug courts typically
handle nonviolent criminal offenders who, after either pleading guilty
or accepting responsibility in some other form, enter a drug treatment
program overseen by the courts. Judges and court personnel, in con-
junction with treatment providers, closely monitor clients' participa-
tion and progress in the programs, which vary in their form, structure,
and duration-for example, residential versus outpatient.217  Drug
courts use an array of remedial devices, from punitive sanctions to
various treatment regimes, to respond to client progress or relapse
during treatment. Crucially, they typically view relapse not as a failure
that terminates treatment and forces offenders back to traditional
courts, but as an expected hurdle in a long recovery process that re-
qires the court to adjust its remedial response. Addicts are expected
to relapse, perhaps many times, yet treatment can still succeed.
Note again the similarity of this approach to Ayres's and
Braithwaite's responsive regulation for corporate activity. It is contex-
tual, designing different treatment programs for different offenders,
and includes a range of possible government responses and sanc-
'. I rely heavily for my account of drug courts on Michael C. Doff & Charles F.
Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV.
831 (2000).
J7 Use of the "client" nomenclature in treatment programs, rather than "offender"
or "defendant," is itself a sign of a shift away from punitive criminal law. This is com-
parable to some regulatory contexts, in which firms may be viewed as "providers,"
"employers," "partners," or simply firms.
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tions."8 It fosters and relies on trust, cooperation, and persuasion, but
is backed up by monitoring and the threat of punitive sanctions,
which are used only when less punitive options have temporarily
failed.21 9 It is sensitive to the offender's response to regulation and ad-
justs regulation according to good measures of efficacy, such as, how
well the court's plan works at reducing social harm.2° It aims to rein-
tegrate offenders into society rather than shame them in an unpro-
ductive, alienating fashion; punishment works within a larger reme-
dial program to build commitment to compliance.2 "
This mix of sanctions and treatment seems to work at retaining
clients in treatment better than both traditional criminal courts and
noncourt treatment programs.222 Note also the conceptual shift that
supports the drug court movement. Drug courts reconceptualize both
the nature of addiction and a limited, but widespread, form of crimi-
nal offending. Instead of viewing drug usage and the related criminal
activity stemming from it as a moral failing that deserves criminal
condemnation and is appropriately deterred with punitive sanctions,
drug courts recognize and respond to the medical, psychological, and
social nature of addiction behavior. Without decriminalizing drug us-
age or even leaving the criminal justice system, drug courts have
evolved into flexible bodies comparable to administrative agencies
that engage in long-term monitoring of offenders, emphasize coop-
erative and therapeutic approaches over punitive approaches, greatly
reduce the attendant social costs of criminal punishment, and provide
more cost-effective use of the public resources addressing criminal
misconduct.221 In fashioning a flexible, client-sensitive, cost-efficientremedial approach to wrongdoing, drug courts are a street crime ana-
218 AYRES & BRAITMwArTE, supra note 34, at 35-38 (positing a pyramid of enforce-
ment activities with increasing punitive power).
219 See id. at 25-26 ("The trick of successful regulation is to establish a synergy be-
tween punishment and persuasion.").
22, See id. at 35-38 ("Regulatory agencies have maximum capacity to lever coopera-
tion when they can escalate deterrence in a way that is responsive to the degree of un-
cooperativeness of the firm.").
2, See id. at 51 (noting the greater importance placed on the "moral educatihe ef-
fects" of regulatory punishment).
222 See Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT'L DRUG CT.
INsT. REv. 1, 23-24 (1998) ("[D]rug courts generate savings in jail
costs[,] ... probational supervision, police overtime and other criminal justice
costs... [, as well as] victimization, theft reduction, public assistance and medical
claims costs. .. ").
223 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 216, at 849-50 (detailing review assessments of drug
court performance). This is so even though such courts often deal with offenders who
have substantial criminal histories. Id. at 850.
THE COATINGENCY OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
logue to regulatory reforms that replace overly punitive and expensive
command-and-control tactics such as those employed at times by
OSHA or the EPA.
C. Therapeutic and Restorative Justice Approaches to Street Crimre
The criminal justice system also utilizes a number of active models
for resolving a large set of traditional street crimes through alterna-
tives to adversarial adjudication and punitive sentencing. An array of
programs fits this description and goes by various names, including
victim-offender mediation, restorative justice, and reparative proba-
tion. For brevity, I will focus on only two examples to demonstrate
that strategies similar to white-collar regulatory models have proven, if
small-scale, track records in street crime policy that could provide a
basis for expanding reform efforts.
1. Victim-Offender Mediation
Victim-offender mediation ("VOM"), while marginal to the main-
stream criminal justice system, now has a quarter-century history in
the United States and is found in several hundred local justice sys-
tems.' These programs typically bring offenders and victims together
with a mediator, often after separate, premediation discussions. They
focus on allowing the victim to provide input on sanctions and repara-
tions and give her an opportunity to express how the crime has af-
fected her.; - A typical case for VOM could be as serious as a felony
burglary and property theft; a typical resolution could be an apology
and acceptance of responsibility, a restitution agreement, or sanctions
normally found in probation, such as community service.2 16 TOM
See Gordon Bazemore & Curt Taylor Griffiths, Conferences, Circles, Boards, and
Mediations: The "N\ew Wave" of Community Justice Decisionmaking, FED. PROBATION, June
1997, at 25, 26-29 (explaining models of community justice decisionmaking and the
was in which community groups are involved in the sanctioning process); Mark S.
Umbreit & William Bradshaw, lictim Experience of Meeting Adult vs. Juvenile Offenders: A
C(os-National Comparison, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1997, at 33, 33-36 (providing statistical
studies of victim responses to "-ictim-offender reconciliation" programs).
"_" Bazemore & Griffiths, supra note 224, at 29; Umbreit & Bradshaw, supra note
224, at 33-34; see also id. at 34 (summarizing studies finding high victim satisfaction with
VOM processes); id. at 38 (reporting the "high level of overall satisfaction experienced
by crime victims who participate in a mediation session ith the offender regardless of
whether the offender is ajuvenile or an adult").
" See Bazemore & Griffiths, supra note 224, at 25 (giving various examples of the
contexts in which VOM has been implemented). XOM is used mostly for property and
nonviolent crimes, though it is occasionally employed for serious, violent crimes at a
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sometimes occurs in lieu of prosecution, but it can also be a sentenc-
ing substitute after a guilty plea. 27
The model has two interesting features. One is the similarity,
again, to "tripartite" regulation that integrates third parties, such as
public interest groups or unions at work sites, into the relationship be-
tween a firm and its regulator. Union and worker involvement, for
example, was a key to the success of OSHA's Cooperative Compliance
Program.22" Ayres and Braithwaite argue for "tripartism" as a general
model for business regulation both to reduce agency capture and to
facilitate mutual understanding among firms or offenders, regulators,
and public or victim groups.29 That sort of cooperative communica-
tion not only frequently leads to mutually agreeable strategies for ad-
dressing wrongdoing and social harm, but also "transforms confronta-
tional disputes into accommodative encounters" and facilitates less
punitive and less alienating remedies.2 The victim's involvement in
VOM serves much the same purpose-promoting mutual understand-
ing between victim and offender-which may lessen the victim's de-
sire for punitive sanctions and aid the offender's appreciation of the
full social harm she caused. VOM has the potential to provide better,
yet less punitive, remedies for clearly culpable wrongdoing.
Second, VOM demonstrates the contingency of culpability judg-
ments and sanctions even for clear cases of crime, particularly those of
mid-level seriousness-worse than petty offenses, but not as severe as
homicides or large-scale frauds. These mid-level crimes are cases the
state is determined to address, rather than decline to charge due to
mitigating factors or resource constraints, but for which the state has
no easy civil remedy alternative. Unlike many examples of corporate
wrongdoing, in which restitution is easy and deterrence fulfilled with
fines so that expressive and retributive goals can be abandoned, VOM
deals with many offenses in which culpability remains a key issue. Yet,
such cases are resolved through VOM in a less punitive way than tradi-
tional criminal punishment and with lower social costs; at the same
time, both victim interests and the goal of offender reintegration, or
at least nonalienation, are better served. Creative innovations like
VOM, then, suggest that culpability need not lead to harsh, expressive
sanctions, even for traditional street crimes
victim's request. Id. at 27.
22 Umbreit & Bradshaw, supra note 224, at 33.
228 REES, supra note 33, at 135-38.
229 aEs & BRAITHwAITE, supra note 34, at 98.
230 Id. at 81-100.
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2. "Survivor-Centered" Domestic Violence Policies
Prosecution of domestic violence is another realm of street crime
that, like drug crime, has shifted substantially to a more traditional,
punitive policy in the last two decades. Many states and localities have
adopted mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies for do-
mestic violence incidents, mandating the harshest mode of punitive
231justice even in cases in which the victim opposes prosecution. De-
spite such harshness, these policies were adopted with progressive mo-
tives. They are in large part the product of a successful campaign by
feminists and women's rights advocates against states' long histories of
failing to respond to domestic abuse of women.2  Despite those mo-
tives and the flawed policy this approach replaced, the increasing evi-
dence of the ineffectiveness and social costs of mandatory interven-
tion (accepted increasingly by some women's advocates) demonstrates
the inappropriateness of narrowly conceived, punitive criminal justice,
even for a classic violent crime such as domestic assault or battery.
Several studies now strongly suggest that mandatory arrest and
prosecution policies do not deter abusers but in fact often aggravate
patterns of abusive conduct. One study found that the mandatory ar-
rest of offenders with indicia of minimal social support-unemploy-
ment, failure to graduate from high school, not being married-actu-
all), led to moe acts of violence by these offenders than when the
police failed to arrest them. While the arrest of more socially inte-
grated offenders-employed, educated, married-led to fewer repeat
offenses, a policy of mandatory arrest that is insensitive to these social
i For an overview of current prosecution programs, see LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN
EL A., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 14 (1992) (not-
ing that, as of 1988, ninety percent of urban police agencies had mandatory or pre-
ferred arrest policies); Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth:
Dia,,loping Effective' Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Rela-
tiwi'hips, 15 I-IMLINE L. REV. 115, 128-29, 135-37, 150-51 (1991) (describing Duluth,
Minnesota's influential policy and noting that Duluth requires prosecutors to sub-
poena all victims, whether cooperative or uncooperative); Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative
Approach, to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes: An Overview, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINALJUSTICE RESPONSE 161 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa eds., 1992) (stating that jurisdictions with aggressive or no-drop policies in-
clude Alexandria, Virginia; Baltimore; Brooklyn; Denver; the District of Columbia; Du-
luth; King County, Washington; Los Angeles; San Diego; and San Francisco).
_&t ge acally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
D,,m,,rtic Vokhnce Prosecutions, 109 FLRV. L. REv. 1849 (1996) (describing feminist activ-
ism and theory in support of no-drop domestic violence policies and endorsing those
p ,licics on feminist grounds as the best among imperfect options).
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dynamics can aggravate domestic violence. 3 One survey of prosecu-
tion programs found women who file charges in jurisdictions that al-
low them to drop charges face a lower risk of subsequent abuse than
women in no-drop jurisdictions. A third study found no effect on
abuser recidivism from prosecution; repeat offending was unaffected
by whether a case was not charged, was dismissed, or was prose-
cuted. 35 While these studies are not enough to refute no-drop poli-
cies completely, they document exactly the sort of perverse effects that
administrative regulation has recognized in corporate contexts.
Harsh punitivism-raising the "price" of crime-does not necessarily
yield the response deterrence analysis suggests. It can engender resis-
tance and resentment that combine with social capital deficits to ag-
gravate rather than alleviate crime.
Moreover, based on extensive clinical psychological evidence,
Linda Mills has recently argued that mandatory intervention policies
often result in state actors replicating the rejection, degradation, and
social isolation that abuse victims suffer from their abusers.2 Among
other responses, state actors often subtly blame victims for not resist-
ing abuse and respond to victims' uncooperative, fragile, or indecisive
demeanors with paternalistic hostility. These responses may stem,
Mills suggests, from officials' own frustration with having little power
to remedy the violence they confront in their work.117 Without sum-
marizing Mills's extensive argument and literature survey here, she
proposes as a response to the emotional trauma women suffer in
mandatory prosecution locales a "survivor-centered model" of law en-
238forcement for domestic violence. Under this proposal, rather than
dictating to victims that prosecution of abusers is the only option, offi-
233 See SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 231, at 152-53, 160-64 (theorizing that some
abusers want to demonstrate that they are not deterred), discussed in Linda G. Mills,
Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REv.
550, 565-66 (1999) ("Indeed, mandatory arrest may actually increase the incidence of
violence in some battered women's lives.").
24 David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters:
Process, Problems and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WrIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT" TREND'S
AND EvALUATION 127, 144, 151-57 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993), discussed in Mills, supra
note 233, at 567.
235 Robert C. Davis et al., The Deterrent Effect of Prosecuting Domestic Violence Misde-
meanors, 44 CRImE & DELINQ. 434, 441-42 (1998) ("We found no evidence that prose-
cution outcomes affected the likelihood of recidivism in domestic violence misde-
meanor cases."), discussed in Mills, supra note 233, at 567-68.
6 ills, supra note 233, at 582-86.
237 Id. at 570-73, 582-86.
238 Id. at 596-609.
THE CONTINGENCY OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
cials work in cooperative and supportive ways with victims, with a bet-
ter understanding of their psychological and social predicaments, to
allow women to choose prosecution or alternatives with minimal in-
timidation from abusers. In this model, officials acknowledge
women's complicated ties with abusers as spouses, parents of their
children, and income providers; recognize religious and cultural be-
liefs that discourage or stigmatize separation; treat victims with respect
that they often do not receive in personal relations elsewhere; reas-
sure them through help in planning with safe house or social support
services; and present prosecution as one of several options that may be
appropriate in the victim's case. The officials offer alternatives, in-
cluding counseling services for the victim and the batterer and family
mediation services to repair family relationships that can then support
the victim. In this way, the model serves the original feminist goal of
supporting women and taking domestic violence seriously while
minimizing the substantial downsides of no-drop policies.
The point is that punitive justice approaches, here as elsewhere,
may impose high social costs on victims and social groups and ill serve
key goals such as reducing future wrongdoing. While prosecution is
fully justified as an expressive act and a retributive judgment, the
larger balance of social goals and contextual factors may call for a less
punitive and more regulatory, cooperative, and context-sensitive re-
sponse. The lessons from white-collar enforcement work as well with
some violent crimes, like domestic abuse, as they do with nonviolent
drug crimes or "quality of life" misdemeanors.
D. Conclusion
These examples, one may notice, represent a broad slice of the
criminal justice system. Drug courts address the single largest cate-
gory of crimes that fill contemporary court dockets, though reforms
target mainly users, not dealers.2" Similarly, violence among intimates
is a large part of violent crime, and property offenses among neigh-
bors, the typical case for victim mediation, is a large part of property
crime. " The range of strategies that make up community policing
Key Crime &Justice Facts, supra note 77.
BUREALU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999 STATISTICAL TABLES, at tbl. 37 (1991),
http://ww%.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cus99.pdf [hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL
TBLES] (documenting that more than half of personal crimes of violence involve
nonstrangers); Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Concern About Neighbor-
hood Crime Doubles Among Black Households (June 19, 1994),
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can affect a broad range of street crime; advocates claim it plays a role
in the reduction of rates for homicide and other serious crimes."' In
short, while punitive justice with a retributive function always has a
role in criminal justice, much of the street crime justice system can be
reformed with insights from social influence and costs research, de-
velopment of civil alternatives, and renegotiation of civil and criminal
strategies in ways roughly comparable to white-collar contexts. We
can build a civil, regulatory, less punitive alternative to current street
crime enforcement that comes much closer to matching the scope of
the one that exists for corporate activity.
CONCLUSION
The barrier to this transformation is not primarily differences in
offenders or lack of potential alternatives. The hurdle is largely in the
ideological infrastructure through which we build, practice, and assess
criminal and regulatoryjustice. Whether or not labeling theory-the
idea that the label of one as a deviant furthers one's self-identification
as a deviant 4-explains much about causes of crime, an analogous
effect works on public perceptions. Enforcement practices consis-
tently address street crime as the most culpable wrongdoing and
white-collar crime as readily amenable to civil remedies. That practice
helps to further entrench views of street offenders as distinctive and
more blameworthy than other wrongdoers.
Even though some conduct merits the criminal law's moral con-
demnation, other considerations intrude. Society wants several things
from legal responses to wrongdoing: deterrence, prevention, restitu-
tion, acceptance of responsibility, minimal social costs, and minimal
administrative costs. Other mechanisms besides criminal conviction
can get us there. Those goals not only sometimes conflict with judg-
ing culpability, but they also mediate our determinations of culpability
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/can.pr ("Many convicted offenders report
committing crimes near where they lived. For example, the BJS's 1991 survey of state
prison inmates disclosed that 43 percent of prisoners were serving time for offenses
committed in their own neighborhoods. This included 45 percent of violent offenders
and 52 percent of drug offenders."); see also 1999 STATISTICAL TABLES, supra, at tbls. 33-
34 (documenting the number of family violence crimes by type of relationship).
241 See Harcourt, supra note 197, at 292-93 (summarizing sources for this assertion
including GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 24 (1996); WESLEY G.
SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS 75 (1990)).
242 See JOHN BRAITI-IvAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 16-21 (1989)
(summarizing labeling theory, but doubting its explanatory power).
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itself. Blamneworthy conduct need not be dealt with through criminal
law's unique condemnation. The process of prioritizing this mix of
the policy goals is a political and ideological one. It is political in the
basic sense that powerful groups can adjust the mix to their favor;
corporate interests have greater ability to influence legislative and ex-
ecutive policymaking toward cooperative regulation and away from
punitive justice. It is political, however, in the broader sense that the
practices we choose among criminal law and its alternatives shape and
reflect our culture, identity, and social relations.
The contingency of criminal liability has distributional conse-
quences as well. We distribute culpability unevenly across the spec-
trum of wrongdoers. Street offenders incur punitive blame dispropor-
tionately, which creates social identities that exaggerate culpability
relative to white-collar wrongdoers. Despite explicit conduct and
harm, crime is always a socially constructed notion. Views of wrongdo-
ing and culpability vary over time and context so that injurious acts
that once were damnum absque injuria become malum prohibitum and
even inalun in se offenses. 2 13 We use many criteria in charging and en-
forcement decisions to determine real culpability beyond elements of
an offense. Our social judgments of when injurious acts become
wrongdoing, and wrongdoing becomes culpable, hinge on contextual
and ideological influences.
That was a key part of Sutherland's arguments half a century ago
about white-collar wrongdoing-we let class bias mislead us into treat-
ing corporate wrongdoing nonculpably. Sutherland urged that we re-
spond to white-collar wrongdoing with more criminal law.44 That idea
may have had some merit half a century ago. While current regula-
tion of white-collar wrongdoing now includes a large array of criminal
sanctions, it remains appropriately dominated by noncriminal reme-
dies. Xk'hite-collar policy is approaching about as good a civil-criminal
mix of sanctions and compliance strategies as we are likely to get in
'11 For discussions of how criminal law shapes preferences, see Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1; Kahan & Posner, supra note 143, at 376-78.
,I; SUTHERLAND, supra note 123. This remains a prominent position today in
criminological literature. See, e.g., HAINES, supra note 18, at 4 ("Following Sutherland,
the must consistent demand [among scholars through the 1990s] was for use of the
criminal law."); Kitty Calavita & Henry N. Pontell, The State and White-Collar Crime: Sav-
ing the Saving and Loans, 28 L. & SOc'v REv. 297, 298 (1994) (noting "a vast literature"
following Sutherland's work); Celia Wells, The Decline and Rise of English Murder: Corpo-
at, Cim, and Individual Responsibility, 1988 CRIM. L. REv. 788 (advocating broader
criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing).
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the near future. At minimum, it is much better than our mix for
street wrongdoing. White-collar criminal sanctions provide "big guns"
for the worst wrongdoing that deserves moral blame, while a broad
range of creative, and sometimes harsh, civil sanctions predominate.
Civil sanctions serve prevention and restitution goals better than
criminal law and give more attention to punishment's social costs, ef-
fects on social norms, and backlash effects. We have nothing like that
productive range of strategies for street crime, and as a result, we suf-
fer much higher social costs, less effective prevention, and excessive
imposition of moral blame.
Thus, it is not that corporate crime should be handled more like
street crime. Rather, street crime should be addressed more like cor-
porate crime. The corporate crime model points toward ways to
minimize the role of criminal law generally, especially with respect to
utilitarian functions.24 Given its high ancillary costs, we could reserve
criminal law for where we need not only a utilitarian tool, but also an
expressive or retributive one. That shift would take greater advantage
of knowledge of social norms and structural restraints, and it would
serve interests in distributive equity. Howeverjust retributive and ex-
pressive goals are in theory, the fact is that punishment based on just
deserts is applied inequitably. Punishments that express culpability
are much more frequently applied to the poor-to street offendersit'1
White-collar offenders face less expressive, condemnatory sanctions
that mitigate, rather than aggravate, views that their wrongdoing is
morally blameworthy and that impose fewer social costs. Within its
universe of regulatory tools and sanctions, corporate regulation is
relatively stingy with criminal judgments. For distributive equity and
more effective policy, we should also look to that model for regulation
of street crime.
245 Both white-collar and street sectors are overcriminalized. See Stuntz, supra note
137, at 15-19 (describing why legislatures allow overcriminalization). But for street
crime, we actually use criminal statutes much more than in white-collar settings. Over-
criminalization is a problem of active enforcement practice in the former context, but
largely only a theoretical problem of statutory breadth in the latter.
Cf Braithwaite, supra note 213, at 280 (arguing that a desert-based theory ends
up, in practice, imposing substantially harsher penalties on the poor than on the rich
and, ironically, a minimalist punishment structure-one that imposes punishment "as
low as we can [make) it without clear evidence that crime has increased as a result"-
turns out to be more equitable).
